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WEEKLY UPDATE FOR DECEMBER 31,
2009
Washington Supreme Court
Excited Utterances. The state
confrontation clause, Wash. Const. art. I, § 22, is more protective
than the Sixth Amendment. Statements by this domestic violence
victim to a 911 operator were admissible under the Sixth Amendment (Crawford
/ Davis) because they were made under circumstances suggesting
that the declarant was simply seeking help. The statements made by
the domestic violence victim to the 911 operator were admissible
under article I, § 22, because they fell within the res gestae
doctrine as it existed when our state constitution was adopted.
State v. Pugh, No.
80850-3 (Dec. 31, 2009). Justice Chambers authored
a concurrence. Justice
Sanders
dissented.
[Editor’s note: The traditional res gestae
doctrine requires each statement to be analyzed in light of the
six-part Beck v. Dye test:
(1) The statement or declaration made must
relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some
way characterize that event;
(2) it must be a natural declaration or
statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of
a past, completed affair;
(3) it must be a statement of fact, and not
the mere expression of an opinion;
(4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive
utterance of thought, dominated or evoked by the transaction or
occurrence itself, and not the product of premeditation,
reflection, or design;
(5) while the declaration or statement need
not be conincident or contemporaneous with the occurrence of the
event, it must be made at such time and under such circumstances
as will exclude the presumption that it is the result of
deliberation, and
(6) it must appear that the declaration or
statement was made by one who either participated in the
transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which the
declaration or statement was made.]
Judicial Immunity. A deputy, who was
transporting a prisoner from court to jail pursuant to a judge’s
order, is not protected by judicial immunity from a suit for
injuries the prisoner inflicted on another when trying to escape.
Lallas v. Skagit County,
No. 81672-7 (Dec. 31, 2009).
Division One
SVP– Recent Overt Act. A sex offender's
statement to authorities that he will inflict
sexually violent harm against minor boys if he is
not committed is sufficient evidence of a recent overt act to
support a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition when that
statement is considered in the context of the sex offender's history
and mental condition.
In re Detention of Danforth,
COA No. 61967-5-I (Dec. 28, 2009).
Civil Discovery Violations. A court,
subject to the exercise of its sound discretion, has the authority
to hear a motion to compel discovery or a motion for sanctions in
the absence of a CR 26(i)
certification or where the certification is
allegedly defective. The trial court’s decision will be reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard.
Amy v. Kmart of Washington,
L.L.C., COA No. 62312-5-I (Dec. 28, 2009).
[Editor’s note: This decision is contrary to Division Two’s
position. See, e.g. Rudolph v. Empirical Research Sys.,
107 Wn. App. 861, 866, 28 P.3d 813 (2001)]
Crosswalks. A negligence claim for failing
to maintain a safe crosswalk could go forward even though the
plaintiff produced no evidence of any physical defect rendering the
crosswalk inherently dangerous or misleading, and the MUTCD did not
require the city to remove, move, or further regulate the marked
crosswalk at issue.
Chen v. City of Seattle,
COA No. 62838-1-I (Dec. 28, 2009).
Division Two
Lesser Degree Instructions. Defense
counsel's all or nothing strategy in a trial for first degree animal
cruelty was not a legitimate trial tactic and constituted deficient
performance because the defense presented evidence to call into
question the State's theory on starvation, not the entire crime.
State v. Smith, COA
No. 38182-6-II (Dec. 29, 2009).
Division Three
Gant and Guilty Pleas. A defendant
who pled guilty prior to the issuance of Gant, waives the
ability to appeal his conviction on the grounds that evidence was
improperly seized.
State v. Brandenburg,
COA No. 28017-9 (Dec. 29, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Tasers. While tasers and stun guns fall into the
category of non-lethal force, they may still be excessive force when
their use is not justified by the circumstances. An officer who
believes he is dealing with a mentally disturbed individual should
make a greater effort to take control of the situation through less
intrusive means. An officer should give fair warning that he is
going to deploy a taser if the suspect does not comply with orders.
An officer uses excessive force by deploying a taser, without
warning, against a nonviolent, stationary misdemeanant who is 20
feet away from the officer.
Bryan v. McPherson,
No. 08-55622 (Dec. 28, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR DECEMBER 24,
2009
Washington Supreme Court
Vehicle Searches. Once a defendant is handcuffed and
placed in the back of a patrol car, neither officer safety nor
preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest justifies a
warrantless search of a vehicle. When a defendant is arrested on an
outstanding arrest warrant, the crime of arrest is the crime
underlying the arrest warrant.
State v. Valdez, No. 80091-0
(Dec. 24, 2009). Chief Justice Alexander authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Jim Johnson authored a separate
concurring opinion.
[Editor’s note: This case involved the arrest of a driver. No
mention is made regarding the passenger’s access to evidence in the
vehicle, and whether the passenger’s presence justifies a
warrantless search to prevent destruction of evidence. Likely, the
Court did not reach this issue because the "crime of arrest" was the
outstanding arrest warrant."].
Division One
Other Sexual Misconduct. RCW 10.58.090, which permits but
does not require
admission of evidence of other "sexual offenses" in sex offense
prosecutions, is not an ex post facto law, does not violate the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches,
and does not violate either the equal protection or the due process
clauses of the state or federal constitutions.
State v. Scherner,
COA No. 62507-1-I (Dec. 21, 2009).
Other Sexual Misconduct. RCW 10.58.090, which addresses
the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's past sex offenses in
a criminal sex offense action, notwithstanding ER 404(b), does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine, and does not violate the
federal state prohibitions against ex post facto laws in
prosecutions of offenses committed prior to the statute’s effective
date.
State v. Gresham, COA
No. 62862-3-I (Dec. 21, 2009).
Division Two
Time for Trial. A trial that commenced 323 days after the
defendant’s arraignment was timely under CrR 3.3, and did not
violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The
defendant expressly agreed to some of the continuances, and the
illness of one of the State’s witnesses justified many of the
others. A county’s difficulty in accommodating a defendant’s
affidavit of prejudice, however, falls within the "routine court
congestion" category.
State v. Lackey, COA
No. 37682-2-II (Dec. 22, 2009).
Tribal Fishing. If a non-member spouse assists the member
spouse to fish on the Reservation or at the Tribe's usual and
accustomed fishing places in a manner approved in the Tribal Code,
the State cannot impose different conditions unless reasonable and
necessary for the conservation of the resource. When a Tribal Code
does not require the presence of the tribal member, the State
statute that requires the presence of the tribal member cannot be
enforced.
State v. Guidry, COA
No. 37301-7-II (Dec. 22, 2009). Judge Bridgewater dissented.
Public Records Act. A pro se inmate, who prevailed in a
Public Records Act proceeding against the Washington State Institute
for Public Policy (WSIPP), properly saw his award reduced by CR 11
sanctions for false and/or misleading information in an attempt to
inflate the costs he would be awarded under the judgment. CR 78(e)
did not bar WSIPP’s CR 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment on the
inmate’s cost bill.
Mitchell v. Washington State Institute
for Public Policy, COA No. 38777-8-II (Dec. 22,
2009).
Division Three
Statute of Limitations. When a criminal charge is filed
outside the normal statute of limitations, a prudent prosecutor will
allege the facts necessary to toll the statute of limitations in the
charging document. When a statute of limitations challenge is
raised, the State bears the burden of establishing that sufficient
time is tolled to permit the matter to proceed. A period of in-state
incarceration does not toll the statute of limitations.
State v. Walker, COA
No. 26736-9-III (Dec. 22, 2009). [Editor’s note: The charges at
issue here are for bail jumping. To avoid statute of limitation
problems, a prosecutor may wish to file charges when a defendant
first fails to appear in court, rather than after the defendant
reappears.]
Certification of Police Officers. A police officer who
resigned, in anticipation of termination, while an internal
investigation was pending into his handling of a NVOL w/ ID stop,
was properly stripped of his police officer certification as his
lies to his superiors during the internal investigation constituted
disqualifying conduct, specifically the making a false or misleading
statement -- within the meaning of Evidence Rule 609(a) -- to a
public servant pursuant to RCW 9A.76.175. An officer cannot object
to the composition of the hearing panel for the first time on
appeal. The composition of the hearing panel is determined by the
law in effect on the day the appeal is filed.
Martin v. Criminal Justice Training
Commission, COA No. 27435-7-III (Dec. 24, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR DECEMBER 18,
2009
Washington Supreme Court
Custodial Interference. The lawfulness of a custody order
is a question for the trial court to decide as a matter of law in a
prosecution for custodial interference. Knowledge of the right to
physical custody is not an implied element of first degree custodial
interference.
State v. Boss, No.
81897-5 (Dec. 17, 2009).
Exceptional Sentences. A trial court, following a
Blakely-based reversal of an exceptional sentence, is authorized
to impanel a jury for the purpose of considering whether aggravating
factors exist that bear on resentencing when the defendant was not
given notice before trial of the State's intent to seek an
exceptional sentence and the factors upon which its request is
based. Impaneling a jury to consider aggravating factors does not
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
State v. Powell, No.
80496-6 (Dec. 17, 2009). Justice Stephens authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Owens authored a
dissenting opinion.
[Editor’s note– The lead opinion indicates that
aggravating circumstances do not have to be included in the
information. Including the aggravating circumstances in the
information, however, prevents the defendant from entering a guilty
plea to only the "base crime." See generally State v.
Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 802 P.2d 116 (1990) (a defendant must
plead guilty to the entire charge unless the prosecution agrees to
accept a partial plea).]
Negligent Investigation. Stepparents do not have standing
to bring a claim of negligent investigation against the Department
of Social and Health Services pursuant to RCW 26.44.050.
Ducote v. State of WA Dept. of Social &
Health Services, No. 81714-6 (Dec. 17, 2009).
Justice Chambers authored a
dissenting opinion.
Growth Management Act. The Western Washington Growth
Management Hearings Board properly concluded that the County must
revise its comprehensive plan to conform to 1997 amendments to the
GMA that set out criteria for establishing limited areas of more
intensive rural development and rural densities. The Board, however,
erroneously relied on a "bright line" rural
density rule of no more than one residence per five acres.
Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise &
Whatcom County, No. 80810-4 (Dec. 17, 2009).
Division One
Legal Financial Obligations. The denial of a RCW
10.01.160(4) motion to terminate legal financial obligations that
were imposed as part of the judgment and sentence is not appealable.
State v. Smits, COA
No. 62243-9-I (Sept. 21, 2009, publication ordered Dec. 14, 2009).
Felony Murder. Second degree felony murder, predicated
upon assault, does not violate equal protection despite the fact
that a defendant who is charged with intentional murder may have a
jury instructed on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
State v. Gordon, COA
No. 63815-7-I (Dec. 14, 2009).
Exceptional Sentences. Where an appellate court has
further defined the legal standard of a statutory aggravating
factor, the failure to set that standard out in a jury instruction
is an error of constitutional magnitude that may be raised for the
first time on appeal.
State v. Gordon, COA
No. 63815-7-I (Dec. 14, 2009). [Editor’s notes: There are pattern
jury instructions for both of the aggravating circumstances,
deliberate cruelty and victim vulnerability, that were at issue in
this case.]
Community Custody. Former RCW 9.94A.737(2), a statute
directing that when an inmate violates the conditions of community
custody a third time, he must be sent back to prison for the
remainder of his original sentence, only applies to an inmate who
committed the crimes for which the inmate was originally sentenced
prior to its effective date.
Wa. State Dept. of Corrections v. Madsen,
COA No. 62143-2-I (Dec. 14, 2009).
Division Two
Pro se. Absent a court order, standby counsel does not
have a duty to obtain affidavits or subpoena witnesses in support of
the pro se defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea.
State v. Pugh, COA
No. 38149-4-II (Dec. 15, 2009).
LUPA. A motion for reconsideration of a county hearing
examiner's decision is a "final
determination" under former RCW 36.70C.020(1)(a) (1995), even
though a motion for reconsideration is pending with the county. A
motion for reconsideration, filed pursuant to a local county’s
procedures, does not toll the strict LUPA filing deadline.
Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care,
COA No. 37583-4-II (Dec. 15, 2009).
Unfair Labor Practices. The termination of a police
officer, who had signed a last chance employment agreement following
a DUI arrest, for violating a no contact order and for using his
badge to enter a night club without paying a cover charge, while in
the midst of litigating ULPs with the union regarding random drug
testing, did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The union did
not establish that union animus was a substantial motivating factor
behind the officer’s termination.
Yakima Police Patrolman’s Society v.
City of Yakima, COA No. 37865-5-II (Dec. 15,
2009).
Division Three
Juror Misconduct. Evidence that various jurors referred to
a party’s attorney in a "racially derogatory" manner during
deliberations, was sufficient to justify the grant of a new trial.
Turner v. Stime, COA
No. 27037-8-III (Dec. 17, 2009).
Public Records Act. A county fails to adequately search
its records for a requested document when it does not examine the
original computer upon which the requested record was created. There
is no cause of action under the PRA to enforce the re-disclosure of
records known by the requester to already be in its possession. The
scope of discovery in a PRA case is limited to whether complete
disclosure has been made by the agency in response to a request for
information.
Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County
v. County of Spokane, COA No. 27184-6-III (Aug.
11, 2009, publication ordered Dec. 15, 2009).
Ohio Supreme Court
Cell Phones. The warrantless search of data within a cell
phone seized incident to a lawful
arrest is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment when the search is
unnecessary for the safety of law-enforcement officers and there are
no exigent circumstances.
State v. Smith, No.
2009-OHIO-6426 (Dec. 15, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR DECEMBER 11,
2009
United States Supreme Court
Emergency Entry. The Fourth Amendment was not violated
when officers forced their way into a home, without a warrant, in
order to provide emergency aid to the occupants. The officers were
responding to a report of a disturbance, and when they arrived on
the scene they encountered a tumultuous situation in the house and
signs of a recent injury, perhaps from a car accident, outside.
Officers do not need ironclad proof of "a likely serious,
life-threatening" injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.
Michigan v. Fisher,
No. 09-91 (Dec. 7, 2009). [Editor’s note: This decision states that
an officer’s subjective belief that someone is seriously injured is
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. Existing Washington case law,
however, requires the State to establish that: (1) the searching
officer subjectively believed an emergency existed; and (2) a
reasonable person in the same circumstances would have thought an
emergency existed. State v. Lynd, 54 Wn. App. 18, 21, 771
P.2d 770 (1989).
Habeas Corpus. A state procedural rule is not
automatically "inadequate" underthe adequate state ground
doctrine—and therefore unenforceable on federal habeas
review—because the state rule is discretionary rather than
mandatory.
Beard v. Kindler, No.
08-992 (Dec. 8, 2009).
Interlocutory Appeals. Disclosure orders about the
attorney-client privilege cannot qualify for immediate appeal.
Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter,
No. 08-678 (Dec. 8, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Social Contacts. The arrival of a second officer can
convert a social contact into an unlawful seizure. Asking a person
to perform an act such as removing hands from pockets adds to the
officer's progressive intrusion and moves an interaction further
from the ambit of valid social contact, toward unlawful seizure.
Requesting to frisk is inconsistent with a mere social contact. If
an officer feels jittery about bulges in a citizen’s pockets, the
officer should terminate the social contact and walk away.
State v. Harrington,
No. 81719-7 (Dec. 10, 2009).
Pro Se Defendants. Const. art. I, § 22, gives a defendant
the right to represent himself on appeal. This right, however, is
neither self-executing nor absolute. An untimely request may be
denied. A defendant who initially appeared through counsel, may have
to demonstrate good cause for the withdrawal of counsel.
State v. Rafay, No.
80865-1 (Dec. 10, 2009).
Merger. When two crimes merge under constitutional double
jeopardy principles, the proper remedy is to vacate the lesser
conviction and impose a sentence on the remaining conviction.
State v. League, No.
82991-8 (Dec. 10, 2009).
Division Two
Closing Argument. A prosecutor does not commit error
during closing argument by calling upon the jury to return a "just
verdict." It is error, however, for a prosecutor to request that a
jury "declare the truth," as it is not the jury’s job to "solve" a
case or to "declare what happened on the day in question." A
prosecutor’s statement to the jury that "in order to find the
defendant not guilty, you have to say 'I don't believe the defendant
is guilty because,' and then you have to fill in the blank," is
improper because it starts from a premise that the jury has a duty
to convict. Comparing the certainty required to convict with the
certainty people often require when they make everyday decisions --
both important decisions and relatively minor ones -- is improper as
it trivializes and ultimately fails to convey the gravity of the
State's burden and the jury's role in assessing the case against the
defendant.
State v. Anderson,
COA No. 37325-4-II (Dec. 8, 2009).
Division Three
Probable Cause to Arrest. An attack on the sufficiency of
probable cause to support an arrest may not be raised for the first
time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a). The defendant’s arrest for fourth
degree assault-DV was supported by probable cause where the
arresting officer responded to a report of domestic violence by a
man against a woman at a particular house, the officer observed
evidence of a struggle in the front yard of that house, the man who
answered the door of the house refused to respond to questions about
what was going on in the house that evening, the only other person
in the house, a woman, looked distraught and disheveled, with puffy
eyes and leaves and grass in her hair, and she had a finger that was
bleeding from a recently torn nail.
State v. Trujillo,
COA No. 27351-2-III (Dec. 10, 2009).
Escape from Community Custody and Bail Jumping. The
defendant’s CCO was properly allowed to testify about telephone
calls she received from the defendant in which the defendant stated,
in offensive language, that he would not be reporting as required,
as these calls were relevant to the mental element. It is not a
defense to a charge of bail jumping that the court did not convene
on the date of the offense.
State v. Aguillar,
COA No. 26998-1-III (Sept. 3, 2009, publication ordered Dec. 8,
2009).
Attorney as Witness. An attorney can be removed from
litigation when he or she is a necessary witness, but a court must
justify this action with appropriate findings regarding the
materiality of the evidence that the attorney will tender, whether
the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and whether the testimony is
or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney's client.
American States Insurance Company v.
Nammathao, COA No. 27641-4-III (Dec. 10, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Prosecutorial Immunity. Although the prosecutor is
entitled to absolute immunity for his decision to charge two
defendants with murder and for refusing to release them for five
days post-charging in light of new information, the prosecutor only
has qualified immunity for advising the police officers to add
murder charges to the booking sheet two days before actually
charging the defendants with murder.
Ewing v. City of Stockton,
No. 08-15732 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2009).
School Interviews. A student who is removed from class to
be questioned by a caseworker and a uniformed police officer
regarding alleged abuse has been seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes. A warrantless seizure of an alleged victim of child sexual
abuse will violate the child’s Fourth Amendment rights unless the
officers have a court order, exigent circumstances, or parental
consent.
Greene v. Camreta,
No. 06-35333 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR DECEMBER 4, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. It was objectively
unreasonable for the Florida Supreme Court to conclude there was no
reasonable probability the sentence would have been different if the
sentencing judge and jury had heard the significant mitigation
evidence that Porter’s counsel neither uncovered nor presented.
Specifically, defense counsel failed to discover and present
evidence of the defendant’s abusive childhood, his heroic military
service and the trauma he suffered because of it, his long-term
substance abuse, and his impaired mental health and mental capacity.
Porter v. McCollum,
No. 08-10537 (Nov. 30, 2009).
Cert. Grants of Interest to Prosecutors:
Double Jeopardy. Renico v. Lett, No. 09-338.
Issue: Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the
Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply clearly established
precedent by denying habeas relief on double jeopardy grounds
when the state trial court declared a mistrial after the
foreperson said that the jury was not going to be able to reach
a verdict.
Washington Supreme Court
Negligent Driving. A law enforcement officer may not issue
a traffic citation for second degree negligent driving, when the
offense did not occur in the officer’s presence. The law enforcement
officer encountered the offender, whose vehicle was facing the wrong
direction on the shoulder of the SR 512 on-ramp, after receiving
reports from other drivers that a vehicle was traveling the wrong
direction on the highway.
State v. Magee, No. 81746-4 (Dec. 3, 2009). Justice
Madsen authored a
concurring opinion, in which
she notes that IRLJ 2.2(b)(2) authorizes a city attorney or deputy
prosecutor to issue a notice of infraction. This rule does not
require that the offense occur in the prosecutor’s presence.
Probation Searches. A probation officer must have probable
cause to believe that a probationer resides at a particular
residence before searching that residence. In this context, probable
cause exists when an officer has information that would lead a
person of reasonable caution to believe that the probationer lives
at the place to be searched. The information known to the officer
must be reasonably trustworthy. Only facts and knowledge available
to the officer at the time of the search should be considered.
State v. Winterstein,
No. 80755-8 (Dec. 3, 2009). Justice Jim Johnson authored a
concurring opinion in which he contends that the
probation officer clearly had probable cause to believe the
defendant lived at the residence.
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine. The inevitable discovery
doctrine is incompatible with article I, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution.
State v. Winterstein,
No. 80755-8 (Dec. 3, 2009). Justice Jim Johnson authored a
concurring opinion in which he contends that the
inevitable discovery doctrine discussion is mere dictum.
On December 1, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court accepted review
of the following cases:
Merger of Crimes. State v. S.S.Y., No. 83299-4.
Pierce County. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn. App. 325
(2009). Whether the legislaturehas clearly expressed its intent
to punish both assault and robbery separately, even if they
might otherwise merge.
Taxation. Bowie v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, No.
83426-1. Grant both Bowie's petition for review and the State's
issues. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn. App. 17 (2009). Whether
the taxpayers, who created and distributed advertising coupon
mailings to Washington residential addresses, are properly
categorized as a publishing business for purposes of determining
the appropriate business and occupations tax rate.
Respondeat Superior. Rahman v. State of Wash., No.
83428-8. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn. App. 345 (2009).
Whether the State is vicariously liable for the injuries
sustained by an intern’s wife, when the wife was an unauthorized
passenger in a vehicle the intern was operating within the scope
of his employment at the time of the collision.
Workman’s Compensation. Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v.
Lee, No. 83433-4. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn. App. 866
(2009). Whether the employer is entitled to second injury fund
relief.
Federal Railroad Safety Act. Veit v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe Corp., No. 83385-1. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn.
App. 369 (2009). Whether the driver’s excessive speed negligence
claims under state law were preempted by the Federal Railroad
Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 20106(a).
Division Three
Land Use. A recreational overlay district that was adopted
to accommodate an extension of a bicycle/pedestrian trail, across
and adjacent to agricultural lands, did not constitute an amendment
to the county's comprehensive plan and did not run afoul of state
statutes that encourage the preservation of agricultural land.
Feil v. Eastern Washington Growth
Management Board, COA No. 28248-1-III (Dec. 3,
2009).
Ninth Circuit
Pro Se Defendants. It was not an abuse of discretion to
deny a pro se defendant’s request for reappointment of counsel and
for a continuance of the trial, when the defendant had previously
received 12 or 13 continuances over a 3 1/2 year period and the
defendant clearly was manipulating his status as represented or pro
se, in order to delay proceedings.
United States v. Thompson,
No. 07-50351 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR NOVEMBER 27,
2009
Division One
Confrontation. Neither Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), nor the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause
precludes a qualified expert from offering an opinion in reliance
upon another expert's work product.
State v. Lui, COA No.
61804-1-I (Nov. 23, 2009).
Witness Tampering. The State is not required to prove that
the defendant believed the was competent to testify according to a
technical legal definition of competency. The victim does not need
to testify under oath for a conviction of witness tampering to be
upheld. An express threat or a promise of reward is evidence that
may support a charge of witness tampering, but it is not an element
of the charge.
State v. Thompson,
COA No. 61998-5-I (Nov. 23, 2009).
DNA Collection Fee. The state and federal constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws are not a basis for avoiding
the application of the 2008 amendment to the DNA collection fee
statute, that removed the "hardship" exemption to the fee.
State v. Thompson,
COA No. 61998-5-I (Nov. 23, 2009).
Division Two
LUPA. A petitioner’s filing of a late administrative
appeal will prevent a petitioner from exhausting administrative
remedies, and will deprive the petitioner of LUPA standing. Lack of
notice did not provide a basis for equitably tolling the statute of
limitations for filing the necessary administrative appeal.
Nickum v. City of Bainbridge,
COA No. 38217-2-II (Nov. 24, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
NOVEMBER 20, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant did not satisfy
the prejudice prong of Strickland as the introduction of
additional mitigation evidence would have opened the door to
damaging evidence regarding a prior murder.
Wong v. Belmontes,
No. 08-1263 (Nov. 16, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Bail Bond Forfeiture. The trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to vacate a default judgment of forfeiture
against a surety when the defendant was returned to custody, through
no efforts of the surety, within the 60 days provided by RCW
10.19.105.
State v. Kramer & All City Bail Bonds,
No. 81071-1 (Nov. 19, 2009). Justice Fairhurst authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
ER 404(b). In a prosecution for armed assault and unlawful
possession of a firearm, evidence that the defendants possessed the
same guns used to shoot into the apartment in separate incidents was
admissible under ER 404(b). The limiting instruction that was
provided to the jury did not constitute an improper comment on the
evidence.
State v. Tieskotter,
COA No. 63816-5-I (Nov. 16, 2009).
Canine Sniffs. A canine sniff of air coming from the open
window of a vehicle is not a search that requires a search warrant.
State v. Tieskotter,
COA No. 63816-5-I (Nov. 16, 2009).
Open Door. A defendant may open the door to evidence that
would otherwise be inadmissible, even if constitutionally protected,
if the rebuttal evidence is relevant.
State v. Tieskotter,
COA No. 63816-5-I (Nov. 16, 2009). [Editor’s note: This holding is
consistent with prior case law, but conflicts with the recent
Division II case of State v. Jones, 144 Wn. App. 284 (2008).]
Firearm Enhancement. A verdict form that uses the term
"deadly weapon" does not preclude the imposition of a firearm
enhancement, if the charging document specifically alleges the
firearm enhancement and the only weapon at issue during the trial is
a firearm.
State v. Tieskotter,
COA No. 63816-5-I (Nov. 16, 2009).
Division Two
Drugs. A conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine in
the kitchen and a conviction for manufacturing marijuana in the
basement did not constitute the same criminal conduct. Convictions
for the manufacturing and possession of methamphetamines do not
comprise same criminal conduct because the possession and
manufacture of methamphetamines require two separate objective
intents -- a present intent and a future intent. Because marijuana
is manufactured directly from marijuana seeds and, under RCW
69.50.101(q), possessing seeds is the equivalent of possessing
marijuana plants, manufacturing of marijuana and possession of
marijuana constitute same criminal conduct.
State v. Bickle, COA
No. 37664-4-II (Nov. 17, 2009).
Terry Stops. An officer may briefly detain a
vehicle's driver for investigation when the officer knows that there
are outstanding arrest warrants for the van's registered owner, and
the driver of the van is the same sex as the registered owner and
appears to fit the physical description of the registered owner.
State v. Bliss, COA
No. 37393-9-II (Nov. 17, 2009).
Time for Trial. Continuances that were granted over the
defendant’s objection to allow trial counsel and the State to engage
in "negotiations" violated the time for trial rule as such
continuances were contrary to RPC 1.2(a) as the defendant had
rejected further negotiations. Continuances granted due to the
purported unavailability of the trial DPA failed on this record, as
there was no indication that the matter was timely assigned to the
trial DPA once negotiations broke down.
State v. Saunders,
COA No. 37621-1-II (Nov. 17, 2009). [Editor’s Note: This case
identifies a trap for the unwary prosecutor. An agreed continuance
under CrR 3.3(f)(1) has to be signed by the defendant. No substitute
is possible. If the defendant can't or won't sign, the continuance
must be supported by findings under CrR 3.3(f)(2).]
Division Three
Jury Misconduct. The trial court did not err by denying a
motion for a new trial based upon a juror looking up the term
"substantial", where the juror did not share the definition with the
other jurors.
State v. Fry, COA No.
27406-3-III (Nov. 19, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
NOVEMBER 13, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The ABA’s Standards for
Criminal Justice do not set the standard by which a defense
attorney’s conduct will be measured.
Bobby v. Van Hook,
No. 09-144 (Nov. 9, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Exceptional Sentences. A the defendant must stipulate to
both facts that compromise an aggravating factor and to judicial
fact-finding before a jury can be dispensed with. A defendant’s
agreement that the court can consider the statements in the
certificate of probable cause to determine the factual basis for the
guilty plea, does not allow the judge to find aggravating
circumstances. Under the sentencing provisions in effect at the time
of the defendant's crime, it was procedurally impossible for the
trial court to impanel a jury to reach a constitutionally acceptable
finding of aggravating factors to support the defendant’s
exceptional sentence. As neither the 2005 nor the 2007 amendments to
the applicable sentencing provisions cured the problem in this case,
and harmless error analysis does not apply, the defendant must be
resentenced within the standard range.
In re Personal Restraint of Beito, No. 77973-2
(Nov. 12, 2009). Justice Jim Johnson authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
Implied Consent Warnings. The implied consent statute and
the WSP warnings are not incomplete and misleading due to the
absence of a warning that under RCW 46.61.506(1), the privilege to
drive could be suspended, revoked, or denied if a test shows the
driver had an alcohol concentration less than 0.08 but the driver is
nevertheless convicted of being under the influence. The statute and
the WSP implied consent warnings are not insufficient due to their
failure to inform the driver that a mandatory jail term flowed from
a conviction after refusing the test.
State v. Elkins, COA
No. 61839-3-I (Aug. 24, 2009, publication ordered Nov. 9, 2009).
Shoreline Hearings Board. The shorelines hearings board
lacks jurisdiction to review conditions to a substantial development
permit where those conditions arise from Clallam County's critical
areas ordinance.
Kailin v. Clallam County,
COA No. 63901-3-I (Nov. 9, 2009).
Division Two
Gant. Evidence of identity theft that was found
during a search of the car after the driver, who was arrested for
use of drug paraphernalia and was secured in the back of the patrol
car, was lawfully seized as the arresting officer testified that he
searched the vehicle for drugs– which is evidence related to the
crime of arrest.
State v. Snapp, COA
No. 37210-0-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Open View. Evidence seized from a car after the driver was
arrested on a misdemeanor warrant and was secured in the back of the
patrol car, was lawfully seized as the officer observed the
chemicals and other methamphetamine manufacturing supplies through
the windows, entered the vehicle solely to secure the hazardous
items, and then obtained a search warrant.
State v. Gibson, COA
No. 37663-6-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Pre-Text Stops. The stop of a vehicle, that officers noted
while leaving a residence after unsuccessfully attempting to serve
an arrest warrant on another named individual, turn without
signaling was not an unlawful pre- textual stop. The stopping deputy
testified that he routinely patrols the area in which he stopped the
defendant and he regularly writes infractions for failing to signal.
State v. Gibson, COA
No. 37663-6-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Opinion Testimony. Testimony that the defendant’s wife
believed the victim’s allegations was improper and prejudicial lay
opinion testimony.
State v. Johnson, COA
No. 37211-8-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Vehicular Assault. Testimony that the officer handed the
special statutory notice form to the interpreter, who then read from
the form in Spanish, is sufficient to support the admissibility of
the blood alcohol result. The State need only prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was advised of his
right to an independent blood test.
State v. Morales, COA
No. 36941-9-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Inevitable Discovery. Beer cans seized from a vehicle
following the arrest of the driver for vehicular assault were
admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant
requirement as the beer cans would have been discovered during an
inventory search as the vehicle was impounded pursuant to statute.
State v. Morales, COA
No. 36941-9-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer. The obstruction
statute, RCW 9A.76.020(1), applies only to obstructive speech, in
addition, to obstructive conduct. Providing a false name, date of
birth, and other inaccurate information that delays the officer’s
ability to identify the defendant is sufficient to support a
conviction for this crime.
State v. Williams,
COA No. 37619-9-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Fees. The assessment levied by the Mason County
Conservation District against landowners within the district a $5.00
per parcel fee to fund programs to protect water quality was a
lawful fee, rather than a tax.
Cary v. Mason County,
COA No. 37981-3-II (Nov. 9, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Inevitable Discovery. A defendant’s motion to suppress
drugs found in a pre-Gant search of a vehicle was properly
denied, as the trooper would have inevitably found the drugs during
an inventory search that was justified by the defendant’s arrest for
DWLS and the defendant’s inability to identify a licensed driver who
could retrieve the vehicle from the side of the roadway.
United States v. Ruckes,
No. 08-30088 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009) [Editor’s note– The court
warned, however, "that the inevitable discovery doctrine will not
always save a search that has been invalidated under Gant.
The government is still required to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that there was a lawful alternative justification for
discovering the evidence."]
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
NOVEMBER 6, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
On Wednesday, November 4, 2009, the Court accepted review of the
following cases:
Criminal Mistreatment. State v. Mitchell, No.
83169-6. Snohomish County. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn.
App. 716 (2009). Granted only on issue of dependant person.
Whether a child may also be a "dependent person"?
Wash-out. State v. Ervin County, No. 83244-7.
King County. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn. App. 561
(2009). Whether incarceration for a probation violation of a
misdemeanor interrupts the wash out period?
Writs of Review. City of Seattle v. Jacob, No.
83277-3. COA opinion reported sub nom at 150 Wn. App. 213
(2009). Whether a writ of certiorari was available to the
prosecution to obtain review of a mass suppression order arising
from the Ann Marie Gordon debacle? Whether suppression of
evidence is an appropriate alternative remedy to dismissal under
CrRLJ 8.3(b)?
Jailhouse Informants. State v. Ish, No. 83308-7.
Pierce County. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn. App. 775
(2009). Granted only on vouching issue. Is it misconduct for a
prosecutor to argue that a plea agreement requires a jailhouse
informant to testify truthfully?
First Amendment. State v. Immelt, No. 83343-5.
Snohomish County. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn.2d 681
(2009). Whether the county noise ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, both facially and as
applied, because it criminalized protected speech. (The
defendant honked her horn to harass her neighbors.)
Telephone Harassment and Witness Intimidation. State
v. Meneses, No. 83172-6. King County. COA opinion
reported at 149 Wn. App. 707 (2009) . Granted only on three
issues; double jeopardy, jury instructions on intent and lesser
included offenses. Whether charges of felony telephone
harassment under RCW 9.61.230 and intimidating a witness under
RCW 9A.72.110 based on the same telephone call constitute the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes, when the charges are
based on separate threats made for different purposes.
Res Ipsa Loquitar. Curtis v. Lein, No.
83307-9. COA opinion reported at 150 Wn. App. 96 (2009).
Division Two
Restoration of Firearm Rights. An individual, who was
convicted of a class B felony, may not have her right to possess a
firearm restored until she has spent 10 crime-free years in the
community following her release from custody.
State v. Mihali, COA
No. 37906-6-II (Sep. 3, 2009, publication ordered Nov. 3, 2009).
Division Three
Residential Burglary. The crime of obstructing a law
enforcement officer cannot serve as a predicate crime for
residential burglary as it is neither a crime against person or
property.
State v. Devitt, COA
No. 27577-9-III (Nov. 3, 2009).
Public Funds. The relocation, at significant expense to
Yakima County, of a wrecking yard from a flood-prone island to a
residential neighborhood was authorized by the county's interest in
limiting further flooding, and, thus, did not constitute a gift of
public property or credit, nor was it an improper land "swap."
Citizen Protecting Resources v. Yakima County, No.
27803-4-III (Nov. 5, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
OCTOBER 30, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
DUI Sentencing. A "prior offense within seven years" under
RCW 46.61.5055 is one thatoccurs before the arrest for the current
offense.
City of Seattle v. Winebrenner,
No. 81279-9 (Oct.
29, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring opinion.
Untruthful Police Officers. An arbitrator’s decision
requiring the reinstatement of a police
officer who was terminated for 29 documented incidents of
misconduct, including untruthfulness,
was not subject to vacation as being contrary to public policy.
Kitsap County Deputy Sheriff's Guild
v. Kitsap County, No. 80720-5 (Oct. 29, 2009). Justice Jim Johnson authored the
dissenting opinion.
Appellate Practice. When a defendant dies while a direct
appeal of his or her conviction is pending, RAP 3.2, providing for substitution of parties on
appeal, allows an heir of the defendant to challenge any financial obligations imposed on the deceased
defendant and to pursue the appeal on the merits. If no one steps forward to seek substitution, the
conviction and all financial obligations will stand.
State v. Webb, No.
81314-1 (Oct. 29, 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
DNA Collection Fee. The DNA collection fee is not
punitive, so the provision in effect at the time of sentencing
applies, regardless of when the crime was committed.
State v. Brewster,
COA No. 62764-3-I (Oct. 26, 2009).
Sexual Contact. Evidence that the defendant touched the
girls' upper inner thighs while rubbing and moving his hand back and
forth and breathing heavily sufficiently establishes contact with
intimate parts for a sexual purpose.
State v. Harstad, COA
No. 61734-6-I (Aug. 24, 2009, ordered published Oct. 26, 2009).
Subdividing Property. A property owner’s creation of two
distinct tax parcels, followed by the sale of one of the tax parcels
to another person, does not create two lawful lots.
Hoggatt v. Flores,
COA No. 63861-1-I (Oct. 26, 2009).
Public Records Act. Personal e-mail addresses used by city
council members to discuss city business are not exempt from
disclosure under former RCW 42.16.310(1)(u). Although the PDA does
not require the City to provide the unredacted e-mails in an
electronic format, on remand the court should consider whether it is
reasonable and technically feasible to do so.
Mechling v. City of Monroe,
COA No. 62011-8-I (Oct. 26, 2009).
Division Three
Gant. The search of an automobile of a defendant,
who is handcuffed and tasered, some distance from the vehicle cannot
be justified as a search incident to arrest. The search cannot be
sustained under the community caretaking/inventory exception as the
trial court did not rely upon that theory.
State v. Gribb, COA
No. 27292-3-III (Oct. 27, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
OCTOBER 23, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Sexually Violent Predators. Due process does not require
the State to plead or prove a recent overt act where the offender
has been confined continuously since being incarcerated for a
predicate sexual conviction.
In re Detention of Fair,
No. 80498-2 (Oct. 22, 2009) (Lead opinion by Justice Jim Johnson).
Justice Fairhurst authored the
concurring opinion. Justice
Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion.
Sexually Violent Predators. The trial court did not err in
allowing the State to inquire of its expert if he had requested an
opportunity to reevaluate the respondent, after the respondent first
raised the issue of the State’s expert’s failure to examine him
after the initial examination in 1996. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion by barring testimony regarding the effectiveness of
the treatment offered at the special commitment center.
In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan,
No. 81230-6 (Oct. 22, 2009). Chief Justice Alexander authored a
dissenting opinion. Justice
Sanders authored a separate
dissenting opinion.
Search of Vehicles Incident to Arrest. Under Const. art I,
§ 7, an automobile search incident to arrest is not justified unless
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search, and the search is necessary
for officer safety or to secure evidence of the crime of arrest that
could be concealed or destroyed. An individual’s attempts to avoid
arrest by fleeing instead of yielding to an officer's exercise of
authority to arrest, does not undermine the existence of an
"arrest."
State v. Patton,
No. 80518-1 (Oct. 22, 2009). Justice Jim Johnson authored a
concurring opinion.
Division One
Firearm Enhancement. A trial court does not exceed its
authority by imposing a firearm enhancement when the jury returns a
special verdict making a deadly weapon finding if the firearm
enhancement was properly charged and the fact that a firearm was
used is necessarily reflected in the jury's general verdict of
guilt.
In re Personal Restraint of Rivera,
COA No. 61835-1-I (Oct. 19, 2009).
Compromise of Misdemeanors. Adhering to its prior
decision, the Court holds that the crime of hit and run of an
attended vehicle is subject to compromise.
State v. Stalker, COA
No. 62549-7-I (Oct. 19, 2009).
Division Two
Booking Questions. A defendant’s answers to routine
booking questions, that were reasonably likely to produce an
incriminating response in light of the charge, should have been
suppressed as the defendant asserted her right to remain silent to
the arresting officer.
State v. Denney, COA
No. 37529-0-II (Oct. 20, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
OCTOBER 16, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Public Records Act. The Public Records Act does not apply
to the judiciary as the judiciary is not included in the PRA’s
definition of "agency." This exemption applies to both court case
files
accessible through the common law, and all other documents.
City of Federal Way v. Koenig,
No. 82288-3 (Oct. 15, 2009). Judge Pro Tem Korsmo authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Stephens authored
the dissent.
Building Code Enforcement. Tacoma's notice of violation
and penalties were not land use final determinations subject to the
procedural requirements of LUPA. Tacoma’s enforcement regimen that
authorizes an appeal from an initial notice of violation and first
monetary penalty, but not from subsequent notices of violation and
monetary penalties, violates due process.
Post v. City of Tacoma,
No. 80684-5 (Oct. 15, 2009). Chief Justice Alexander authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Sanders authored a separate
concurring opinion. Justice
Madsen authored a
dissenting opinion.
Reckless Driving. A police officer lacked the authority
under RCW 10.93.070(2) to arrest a motorcyclist for reckless driving
outside the officer's jurisdiction. Not every instance of reckless
driving will constitute "an emergency involving an immediate threat
to human life or property."
State v. King, No.
80948-8 (Oct. 15, 2009). Justice Chambers authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Fairhurst authored a separate
concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Alexander
dissented. [Note: The
State did not offer evidence in this case to establish the existence
of a valid interlocal agreement under the Washington Mutual Aid
Peace Officers Powers Act. See RCW 10.93.070(1).]
Opinion Testimony. The admission of witness opinion
testimony on an ultimate fact, without objection, may be subject to
review under RAP 2.5(a)(3).
State v. King, No.
80948-8 (Oct. 15, 2009). Justice Chambers authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Fairhurst authored a separate
concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Alexander
dissented.
Division One
Land Use. A LUPA review cannot be conducted of a Board of
County Commissioners (BOCC) remand of an administrative challenge to
a construction site plan to its hearing examiner for further
proceedings, as that decision does is not a final decision that
conclusively determines the rights of the parties by settling the
challenging party’s entitlement to relief.
Harlan Claire Stientjes Family Trust v. Via-Fourre, COA
No. 63865-3-I (Oct. 12, 2009).
Division Two
Recantation. A defendant, who entered an Alford
plea in 1985 to a variety of sex offenses involving his son,
daughter, and step-son, is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas as
to all three victims, as his now-adult children claim that the
defendant never abused them and they did not witness him abuse
anyone else, the State withheld the medical examinations of the
defendant’s children, and the mother of one of the alleged victims
was having an affair with the investigation's supervising detective.
In re Personal Restraint of Spencer,
COA No. 37229-1-II (Oct. 13, 2009).
Public Records Act. An organization that received over 615
documents in response to its public records act request, did not
establish a violation of the public records act due to the Pierce
County Auditor’s failure to retain informational e-mails sent by the
Washington Secretary of State's Office because such e-mails did not
fall within the retention schedules set for local governments.
Building Industry Association of
Washington v. McCarthy, COA No. 38154-7-II
(Oct. 13, 2009).
Land Use. An appeal from the superior court’s reversal of
a Board’s decision to deny a joint-use pier as inconsistent with the
County Code Shoreline Master Program and the Washington State
Shoreline Management Act was rejected as the Board's factual
determinations were unsupported by substantial evidence and its
legal conclusions were clearly erroneous in light of the entire
record and the applicable shoreline policies.
Robertson v. Shoreline Hearings Board,
COA No. 37911-2-II (Oct. 13, 2009).
Division Three
Declination of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction. The juvenile
court can decline jurisdiction over a individual who is younger than
15. A juvenile can waive juvenile court jurisdiction.
State v. Ramos, COA
No. 25740-1-III (Oct. 13, 2009).
Unit of Prosecution. The unit of prosecution for felony
murder is one count per victim, rather than one count per underlying
felony.
State v. Ramos, COA
No. 25740-1-III (Oct. 13, 2009).
Escape. A person commits escape in the second degree when,
after he is arrested, is transported to a booking area, and is
handcuffed to a chair bolted to the floor, the defendant slips out
of the handcuffs and leaves the building.
State v. Gomez, COA
No. 26801-2-III (Oct. 15, 2009).
Expert Opinion. In a prosecution for animal fighting and
operating an unlicensed private kennel, the opinion of the expert
from the Humane Society that the evidence showed that the defendants
intended to engage in dogfighting exhibitions was proper.
State v. Nelson, COA
No.27000-9 -III (Oct. 15, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
OCTOBER 9, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Speedy Trial. An 8-month delay between arraignment and
trial that did not violate the time-for-trial court rule, CrR 3.2,
did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or Const. art. I, §
22 constitutional right to a speedy trial. The analysis under both
article I, section 22 and the Sixth Amendment is the same and
article I, section 22 does not afford a defendant greater speedy
trial rights.
State v. Iniguez, No.
81750-2 (Oct. 8, 2009). Justice Chambers authored the
dissenting opinion.
Open Courtrooms. The trial court’s closure of part of jury
voir dire, in consultation with the defendant and the prosecution,
in order to safeguard the defendant’s article I, section 22 right to
a trial by an impartial jury, did not violate the defendant’s
article I, section 22 right to a public trial.
State v. Momah, No.
81096-6 (Oct. 8, 2009).
Concurring opinion authored
by Justice Pro Tem Penoyar.
Dissenting opinion authored
by Chief Justice Alexander.
Open Courtrooms. Questioning prospective jurors in
chambers regarding sensitive matters violated the defendant’s
article I, section 22 right to a public trial as the Bone-Club
procedure was not followed. A reading of the lead, concurring, and
dissenting opinions appear to support the proposition that
protecting juror privacy will not justify a complete closure of the
courtroom.
State v. Stroud, No.
80849-0 (Oct. 8, 2009) (lead opinion authored by Chief Justice
Alexander and joined in by Justices Owens, Sanders and Chambers).
Concurring opinion authored
by Justice Fairhurst and joined in by Justice Madsen.
Dissenting opinion authored
by Justice Charles Johnson and joined in by Justices Jim Johnson and
Pro Tem Penoyar.
Risk Assessment. An inmate does not have a liberty
interest in earning good time credits at a 50 percent rate. An
inmate who is reclassified to a level that renders him ineligible to
receive the 50 percent rate may appeal that decision to the
superintendent. The appeal need only determine that DOC followed its
procedures to reclassify the inmate.
In re Personal Restraint of Pullman,
No. 80834-1 (Oct. 8, 2009) (overruling In re Personal Restraint
of Adams, 132 Wn. App. 640, 134 P.3d 1176 (2006)). Justice
Sanders authored a
concurring opinion.
Sexually Violent Predators. The sexually violent predator
(SVP) statute, chapter 71.09 RCW, allows the State to perform "[a]
current mental health evaluation" of a prisoner prior to the
commencement of SVP commitment proceedings. A prisoner does not have
a right to counsel at the pre-filing evaluation. A prisoner is not
entitled to a voluntariness hearing to determine if the statements
that he gave prior to and during the SVP proceeding are admissible.
In re Detention of Strand,
No. 80570-9 (Oct. 8, 2009). Justice Sanders authored
the dissent.
Land Use. Development rights vest upon the filing of a a
complete building permit application, not upon the filing of a site
plan review permit application (site plan application).
Abbey Road Group v. City of Bonney Lake,
No. 80878-3 (Oct. 8, 2009) (lead opinion authored by Justice Charles
Johnson, and concurred in by Justices Owens and Stephens).
Concurring opinion authored
by Justice Madsen.
Dissenting opinion authored
by Justice Sanders.
Division One
Violation of a No Contact Order. A charging document,
whether a citation or complaint, that charges a defendant with
violating a no contact order must identify the order alleged to have
been violated, with the date or court of issuance, the name of the
protected person, the cause number, or other facts identifying the
specific order allegedly violated.
Kaiser v. City of Bothell,
COA No. 60651-4-I (Jul. 20, 2009, released for publication Oct. 5,
2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR OCTOBER 2, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Time for Trial. The court rule time for
trial may not be extended due to the unavailability of a judge, due
to the judge’s vacation, without first exploring the availability of
visiting judges or pro tempores to hear the criminal case in an
unoccupied courtroom .
State v. Kenyon, No.
81374-4 (Oct. 1, 2009). Justice Chambers authored a
concurring opinion.
Jury Instructions. Jury instructional
errors that constitute manifest error include: directing a verdict;
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant; failing to define the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard; failing to require a unanimous
verdict; and omitting an element of the crime charged. Instructional
errors not falling within the scope of RAP 2.5(a), that is--not
constituting manifest constitutional error--include the failure to
instruct on a lesser included offense; and the failure to define
individual terms. Jury instruction misstating the law of
self-defense do not automatically amount to an error of
constitutional magnitude and are no longer presumed prejudicial.
State v. O'Hara, No.
81062-1 (Oct. 1, 2009). Justice Sanders
dissented.
Sexually Violent Predators. The detainee’s
trial counsel had a tactical reason for stipulating to certain
evidence. The detainee did not have to personally ratify the entry
of the stipulation. The State is not required to prove that the
detainee would within the foreseeable future to establish he is
currently dangerous.
In Re Detention of Moore,
No. 81201-2 (Oct. 1, 2009). Justice Sanders
dissented.
On Tuesday, September 29th, the Washington
Supreme Court accepted review of the following cases:
CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi). State v.
Garcia-Salgado, No. 83156-4. King County. COA opinion
reported at 149 Wn. App. 702 (2009). Whether the trial court
erred by granting the State’s motion for an order pursuant to
CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi), requiring defendant to submit to a cheek swab
for DNA testing .
Sexually Violent Predators. In re Det.
of Post, No. 83023-1. King County. COA opinion reported at
145 Wn. App. 728 (2009). Whether in an SVP commitment
proceeding, the State may introduce evidence regarding the
Special Commitment Center's (SCC) treatment program that would
be available to the respondent if he was committed as an SVP,
and evidence of the respondent’s unsatisfactory performance in
that program as a voluntary participant.
Division Two
Vehicular Homicide. Vehicular homicide by
disregard for the safety of others, RCW 46.61.520(1)(c), is
classified by the legislature as a nonviolent offense under former
RCW 9.94A.030 (2006), allowing for the imposition of a first time
offender sentence.
State v. Stately, COA
No. 38103-6-II (Sep. 29, 2009).
Exceptional Sentences. If the jury
instructions on an aggravating circumstance informs the jury to
answer the question "no" if they are not unanimous, the court may
not direct the jury to deliberate further if it is clear that the
jury "hung" on that aggravating circumstance.
State v. Coleman, COA
No. 36757-2-II (Sep. 29, 2009).
Shifting Burden. A prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument that the defendant failed to provide any witness from his
brother’s house to corroborate the defendant’s testimony that he
only had two beers and a "sip" of whiskey prior to getting behind
the wheel of a car, prejudiced the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt because the jury could likely infer that the defendant had the
burden to prove that he was not intoxicated.
State v. Toth, COA
No. 38223-7-II (Sep. 29, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR SEPTEMBER 25, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Finality of Convictions. A defendant’s
convictions were final, for purposes of retroactively applying
Blakely, when the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari expired prior to the issuance of Blakely and the
State elected not to retry the defendant on the two reversed counts.
The trial court, therefore, properly refused to resentence the
defendant to a standard range term on the three convictions that
were affirmed by the court of appeals, and to merely enter an order
correcting the judgement and sentence to reflect the reversed
counts. If, however, the trial court exercised its discretion to
revisit the sentence, the defendant would have an appealable issue.
State v. Kilgore, No.
81020-6 (Sep. 24, 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
Identification Procedures. The
identification of a suspect by an acquaintance does not raise the
due process concerns that arise when an eyewitness identification is
tainted by suggestive procedures. A lay-opinion identifying a person
in a photograph is proper when the witness has interacted with the
defendant in a variety of circumstances, in a way the jury could not
in a sterile courtroom setting.
State v. Collins, COA
No. 61646-3-I (Sep. 21, 2009).
Legal Financial Obligations. A decision to
deny a defendant’s motion under RCW 10.01.160(4) to terminate legal
financial obligations (LFOs) that were imposed as part of the
judgment and sentence is not appealable as a matter of right. In
addition, a defendant may not obtain review of such an order because
he is not an aggrieved party under RAP 3.1.
State v. Smits, COA
No. 62243-9-I (Sep. 21, 2009).
Sexually Violent Predators. Under the
plain and unambiguous language of RCW 71.09.020(17), a conviction of
incest in the first degree and proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the child was "under age fourteen," meets the definition of a
sexually violent offense that qualifies as a predicate offense in a
sexually violent predator civil commitment proceeding.
In re Detention of Boynton,
COA No. 61891-1-I (Sep. 21, 2009).
Division Two
Banishment Orders. A banishment order that
bars the defendant from entering a county in order to protect the
mental well being of the child victim and her family does not
survive under the applicable strict scrutiny test. A remand to allow
the judge to tailor a narrower restriction is the appropriate
remedy. Because the banishment order in this case was inexplicably
linked with the imposition of a SSOSA, the trial court, on remand,
is entitled to reconsider its decision to impose a SSOSA.
State v. Sims, COA
No. 37773-0-II (Sep. 22, 2009).
Gant. A defendant may assert a
claim predicated upon Arizona v. Gant for the first time in
the Court of Appeals. No motion to suppress need be filed in the
trial court. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
not available for a search conducted prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gant.
State v. McCormick,
COA No. 37651-2-II (Sep. 23, 2009). The panel disapproves of the
decision in State v. Millan, ____ Wn. App. ____, 212 P.3d
603, 607 (2009), stating that the decision is contrary to existing
law.
Oregon Court of Appeals
Melindaz-Diaz and DUI Machine Records.
Intoxilyzer certificates of accuracy may still be admitted into
evidence post-Melindaz-Diaz without violating a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.
State v. Bergin, No.
A136490 (Sep. 23, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Banishment Orders. A order prohibiting a convicted gang
member from entering the city and County of San Francisco without
the prior approval of his probation officer was constitutional as
the defendant had multiple convictions within San Francisco and
separating a convicted felon from negative influences in his prior
life is reasonably related to the permissible goals of deterrence
and rehabilitation and is a common purpose of supervised release.
United States v. Watson,
No. 08-10385 (9th Cir. Sep. 23, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR SEPTEMBER 18, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Tribal Police Officers. Tribal police officers have
inherent sovereign authority and statutory authority to continue
"fresh pursuit" of motorists who break traffic laws on the
reservation and then drive off the reservation.
State v. Eriksen, No.
80653-5 (Sep. 17, 2009).
Division One
Offender Score. A defendant, who only contended that one
of his California convictions "washed out", is deemed to have
affirmatively acknowledged that the out-of-state convictions are
properly included in his offender score.
State v. Lucero, COA
No. 57684-4-I (Sept. 14, 2009).
Division Two
Time for Trial. Where each of numerous continuances
satisfied various CrR 3.3 criteria, the defendant’s trial, which
began 323 days after his arraignment was timely. The defendant’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated as much of
the delay was due to a witness’s illness and to the defendant’s
request for a new counsel and that counsel’s schedule.
State v. Lackey, COA
No. 37682-2-II (Sept. 15, 2009).
Medical Marijuana. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1), the primary
caregiver defense, may not be expanded to provide a defense to
anyone other than the person named in the documentation. An
individual who resides with a properly designated primary caregiver
may assert a mere "presence or vicinity" defense predicated on RCW
69.51A.050(2).
State v. McCarty, COA
No. 37693-8-II (Sept. 15, 2009).
Specific Performance. A defendant, who requested specific
performance of a plea agreement that erroneously omitted the
mandatory community custody, was only entitled to have the State
recommend the illegal sentence. The trial court is not bound by that
recommendation, and may impose a lawful sentence that includes the
mandatory period of community custody.
State v. Barber, COA
No. 37989-9-II (July 21, 2009, publication ordered Sept. 15, 2009).
Maximum Sentence Terms. A statement in a judgement and
sentence that "[t]he total time imposed for both incarceration and
community custody shall not exceed 120 months" is sufficient to
comply with RCW 9.94A.505(5).
State v. Booth, COA
No. 37790-0-II (Sept. 15, 2009).
Medical Marijuana. Chapter 69.51A RCW provides qualifying
medical users only a defense to criminal prosecution. Chapter 69.51A
RCW neither grants employment rights for qualifying users nor
creates civil remedies for alleged violations of the act.
Roe v. Teletech Customer Management,
COA No. 38531-7-II (Sept. 15, 2009).
Abuse of Process. An action for abuse of process may be
based upon motions filed after a civil action has been properly
commenced.
Hough v. Stockbridge,
COA No. 37382-3-II (Sept. 15, 2009).
Division Three
Sex Offender Registration. The trial court did not err by
relieving a sex offender of his obligation to register, as the sex
offender successfully completed a SSOSA sentence, had spent 10 years
in the community without violating any laws and an expert placed the
offender’s risk of reoffending as "unlikely."
State v. McMillan,
COA No. 27475-6-III (Sept. 17, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
DUI. Police may obtain a search warrant
for a blood sample when a motorist refuses to give consent to a
breath test.
City of Seattle v. St. John,
No. 81992-1 (Sept. 10, 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion
Competency. The trial court did not
violate the defendant’s due process rights by abandoning the
procedures outlined in RCW 10.77.060 for determining competency,
after the defendant’s attorney withdrew his competency challenge and
stipulated to the defendant’s competency.
State v. Heddrick,
No. 80841-4 (Sept. 10, 2009).
On September 8, 2009, the Washington Supreme
Court granted review of the following cases:
Terry Stops. State v. Doughty,
No. 82852-1. Spokane County. COA opinion reported at 148 Wn. App.
585 (2009). Stop of a suspect after the suspect visited a known drug
house at 3:20 a.m. for a two-minute-long visit.
Knapstad. State v. Montano,
No. 82855-5. Grant County. COA opinion is reported at 147 Wn. App.
543 (2008). Whether threats directed toward a transporting officer
could be interpreted by a rational trier of fact as designed to
influence the officer’s course of action.
Wash Out. State v. Moeurn, No.
82995-1. Grays Harbor County. COA opinion is unpublished. What is
the wash-out period for an attempted felony?
Child Abuse Case. State v. Webb,
No. 83177-7. Island County. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn. App. 912
(2009). Competency of child witnesses, Miranda issues.
Sexually Violent Predators. In re Det.
of Hawkins, No. 82907-1. COA opinion is unpublished. Challenge
to a sexual history polygraph as part of a pretrial psychological
evaluation.
Forfeiture Case. Guillen v. Contreras,
No. 82531-9. COA opinion reported at 174 Wn. App. 326 (2008). When
is a claimant a "substantially prevailing party" for purposes of
attorney’s fees in a forfeiture case.
Gambling. Rousso v. State, No.
83040-1. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn. App. 344 (2009). Commerce
Clause challenge to Gambling Act.
Gambling. Internet Cmty. & Entm’t Corp.
v. State, No. 82845-8. COA opinion reported at 148 Wn. App. 795
(2009). On line gaming.
School Funding. Sch. Dists.’ Alliance
for Adequate Funding of Spec. Educ. v. State, No. 82961-6. COA
opinion reported at 149 Wn. App. 241 (2009). Special education
funding.
Prejudgment Interest. Forbes v. Am.
Bldg. Maint. Co. W., No. 82950-1. COA opinion reported at 148 Wn.
App. 273 (2009). Petition granted only on prejudgment interest and
modification of settlement amount issues.
Partnerships. Washington Trust Bank v.
River Gorge, No. 82827-0. COA opinion is unreported. Partnership
liability for hay bill.
Expert Witnesses. Smith v. Orthopedics
Int’l, Ltd., P.S., No. 83038-0. COA opinion reported at 149 Wn.
App. 337 (2009). Ex parte contact with other side’s expert
witnesses.
Division One
Prior Recorded Recollection. A testifying
witnesses’ statement to police, immediately after the crime
occurred, that the police officer reduced to writing, and that the
testifying witness signed under penalty of perjury, is admissible
pursuant to ER 803(a)(5), even though the witness testified at trial
that she could not remember if the statement accurately reflected
what she told the police, because she was too intoxicated..
State v. White, COA
No. 61848-2-I (Sept. 8, 2009).
Closed Courtrooms. No public trial right
was abridged by the trial court conducting a traditional in camera
proceeding on a witnesses’ Fifth Amendment claim. Such a hearing may
be conducted without an on-the-record analysis of the
Ishikawa/Bone-Club factors.
State v. White, COA
No. 61848-2-I (Sept. 8, 2009).
Warrantless Administrative Inspections. A
warrantless administrative search of a business in relations to a
complaint of unprofessional misconduct against a licensed health
care professional may not be conducted until after the disciplining
authority first determines that the complaint has merit. See RCW
18.130.080(2).
Seymour v. Dept. of Health,
COA No. 61494-1-I (Sept. 8, 2009).
Division Two
Demonstrative Evidence. The trial court
abused its discretion by admitting a trigger pull device, as the
identified differences between the trigger pull device affected the
"perceived trigger pull", rendering it insufficiently similar to the
"facts to be proved" at trial.
State v. Hunter, COA
No. 37110-3-II (July 14, 2009, publication ordered Sept. 9, 2009).
Lesser Included Offense Instructions. A
defendant in a second degree murder trial satisfied the factual
basis for both first and second degree manslaughter as the defendant
admitted shooting the victim, but claimed that the shooting was an
accident.
State v. Hunter, COA
No. 37110-3-II (July 14, 2009, publication ordered Sept. 9, 2009).
Destruction of Court Records. GR 15(h) and
RCW 10.97.060 do not authorize the destruction of a court record
from a case that was dismissed without prejudice when the State
could not locate a material witness as the court records do not
constitute "criminal history record information." RCW 10.97.030(1).
State v. Young, COA
No. 37985-6-II (Sept. 9, 2009).
Growth Management. While the language of
RCW 36.70A.480 certainly contemplates that plans under both the
Shoreline Management Act and the Growth Management Act will regulate
critical areas in shoreland regions in some situations and, thus,
suggests that both types of plans can exist at the same time, the
Washington Supreme Court’s result in Futurewise directs that
only the Shoreline Management Act plan can be in effect at one time.
Kapo v. Central Puget Sound Growth
Management Hearings Board, COA No. 38017-0-II
(Sept. 9, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
District Court Judges. Former RCW 3.46.070
did not apply to district court judges sitting as part time
municipal judges in municipal departments and that therefore, the
Spokane County District Court judges had de jure jurisdiction over
municipal court criminal trials.
City of Spokane v. Rothwell,
No. 81271-3 (Sep. 3, 2009)
Forfeiture. A claimant seeking an
"innocent owner" exception to vehicle forfeiture is not required to
prove that she could not have known of the illegal use giving rise
to forfeiture. The term "knowledge" under the meaning of RCW
69.50.505(1)(d)(ii) is satisfied only by proof of actual knowledge.
In Re Matter Forfeiture of One 1970 Chev.
Chevelle/In Re Matter Forfeiture of One 2004 Nissan Sentra,
No. 81116-4 (Sep. 3, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring/dissenting opinion.
Accomplice Liability A person can
be charged as an accomplice to a crime when the principle actors in
the crime are children, and thus legally incapable of committing a
crime.
State v. Bobenhouse, No. 81413-9 (Sep. 3, 2009).
[Note– this case also contains a good "harmless error" analysis for
multiple act cases in which a Petrich instruction is not
given.]
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Self Defense.
Trial counsel was ineffective because counsel misstated the law on
self-defense in an instruction counsel proposed that was given to
the jury and in statements made during closing argument about the
defendant’s self-defense claim. This case is distinguishable from
Studd, because at the time of the defendant’s trial, there were
several cases that should have indicated to counsel that the pattern
instruction was flawed.
State v. Kyllo, No.
81164-4 (Sep. 3, 2009).
Division One
Redaction of Court Records. General Rule (GR)
15 and the factors set forth in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97
Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), must be considered by the court even
when ruling on an uncontested motion to redact a litigant’s full
name from a dismissed unlawful detainer action.
Rousey v. Indigo Real Estate Services,
COA No. 61831-8-I (Aug. 31, 2009).
Electronic Home Monitoring. A
misdemeanant, who is detained before trial on electronic
home monitoring, is not entitled to be credited
for time served.
Harris v. Charles,
COA No. 61629-3-I (Aug. 31, 2009).
Post-Conviction DNA Testing. A convicted
rapist satisfied the procedural requirements for post-conviction DNA
testing of swabs collected from a rape victim . DNA testing that was
available at the time of the crime could not be done when semen was
not detected. Modern STR DNA testing can detect DNA in significantly
smaller samples.
State v. Grey, COA
No. 61709-5-I (Jul 6, 2009, publication ordered Aug. 31, 2009).
Division Two
Unanimity Instructions. An unanimity
instruction was required in a case in which the State did not
identify a specific act for one count and the evidence at trial
included multiple acts that could have provided the basis for a
guilty verdict on that count. The error was not harmless.
State v. York, COA
No. 38185-1-II (Sep. 1, 2009).
Rape. A trial court errs by instructing
the jury, at the State’s request, on the inferior degree offense of
third degree rape in a second degree rape by forcible compulsion
case, when the defendant contends that the intercourse was
consensual and the victim testifies that the intercourse was forced.
State v. Wright, COA
No. 36721-1-II (Sep. 1, 2009). Judge Hunt filed a dissenting
opinion.
Claims Filing Statute. Former RCW
4.96.020(3) (2006) did not require a claimant to personally verify
her administrative claim before filing her lawsuit against a
government body.
Gates v. Port of Kalama,
COA No. 37758-6-II (Sep. 1, 2009). This opinion repudiates the prior
Division Two opinion in Schoonover v. State, 116 Wn. App.
171, 64 P.3d 677 (2003), and creates a split with Division One’s
opinions in Johnson v. King County, 148 Wn. App. 220, 198
P.3d 546 (2009), and Delos Reyes v. City of Renton, 121 Wn.
App. 498, 86 P.3d 155 (2004).
Certificate of Discharge. A defendant, who
had been housed at the Special Commitment Center as a sexually
violent predator, was not entitled to a certificate of discharge
under RCW 9.94A.637(1), as he has not yet completed his community
placement period. The start of the community placement period was
tolled during his confinement as an SVP.
State v. Donaghe, COA
No. 37008-5-II (Sep. 3, 2009). Judge Armstrong dissented. [Note–
this opinion represents a split with Division Three’s opinion in
In re Pers. Restraint of Knippling, 144 Wn. App. 639, 183 P.3d
365 (2008)].
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. A
State’s witnesses’ statement that the defendant was evasive during
police questioning, prejudicially violated the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment and Const. art. I, § 9, privilege against
self-incrimination.
State v. Hager, COA
No. 37539-7-II (Sep. 3, 2009). Judge Hunt dissented, stating that
"The officer's one-time mention of the term "evasive," taken in
context, was not a comment on Hager's exercise of his right to
remain silent, was not a comment on Hager's guilt, and did not
incurably prejudice the jury."
Opinion Withdrawn – Division Two withdraws
its opinion in
In re Personal Restraint of Wiatt,
COA No. 35690-2-II (Sep. 1, 2009). The prior opinion was described
as follows:
Collateral Attacks. A supplemental brief
that contains a new issue and that is filed more than one year
after the challenged conviction became final is time barred. A
transcriptionist’s mistake does not provide a basis for
equitably tolling the one-year time bar contained in RCW
10.73.090. Petitioner’s open court room challenge is rejected
because he explicitly agreed to the courtroom’s closure and he
cannot demonstrate actual prejudice from the closure. A court
should look only at whether a prosecutor’s conduct was improper
and likely to cause prejudice at the time the prosecutor acted,
rather than viewing the conduct through the distorting effects
of hindsight. The doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct does not
apply to police action. A police officers use of some deception
during an investigation does not constitute outrageous
government conduct. In re Personal Restraint of Wiatt,
COA No. 35690-2-II (Jun. 30, 2009). Judge Van Deren dissented
with respect to the open courtroom issue.
Ninth Circuit
Prosecutorial Immunity. When a prosecutor
seeks a material witness warrant in order to investigate or
preemptively detain a suspect, rather than to secure his testimony
at another’s trial, the prosecutor is entitled at most to qualified,
rather than absolute, immunity.
Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,
No. 06-36059 (9th Cir. Sep. 4, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR AUGUST 28, 2009
Division One
Firearm Enhancement. A doubling of the
firearm enhancement pursuant to RCW 9.94A.533(3)(d) does not require
a jury finding as to the existence of the prior felony conviction
with firearm enhancement. A conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm in the first degree, based on his prior conviction for
assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement, and
doubling the term for the firearm enhancements under RCW
9.94A.533(3)(d), based on the same prior assault conviction does not
violate double jeopardy.
State v. Simms, COA
No. 60365-5-I (Aug. 24, 2009).
Search Warrants. Evidence supporting the
issuance of a search warrant for a computer was not stale, even
though the detective did not seek the search warrant until five
months after a known video of child pornography publicly available
for download from the IP address assigned to the defendant. The
presence of 21 other files available for download that had titles
strongly suggestive of child pornography supported an inference that
the defendant was a "collector" and the detective’s training and
experience allowed him to state that collectors of child pornography
often retain the contraband. Most importantly, the detective was
able to declare that evidence of the defendant’s contraband, in the
form of metadata, would likely be found on his computer hardware,
even if the
contraband itself could no longer be viewed on
his computer.
State v. Garbaccio,
COA No. 62161-1-II (Aug. 24, 2009).
Child Pornography. A defendant’s claim
that he accidently downloaded child pornography and that as soon as
he realized that the file contained child pornography, goes to the
possession element of the crime– not the knowledge requirement.
State v. Garbaccio,
COA No. 62161-1-II (Aug. 24, 2009).
Domestic Violence Protection Orders. A
permanent protection order is not invalid when it does not contain
language showing a specific finding made by the issuing court
satisfying the
statutory requirement that for orders exceeding
one year the court must affirmatively find that the respondent is
"likely to resume acts of domestic violence" against his former
spouse and child. Nothing in the statute requires such a finding
appear on the order itself.
City of Seattle v. May,
COA No. 61027-9-I (Aug. 24, 2009).
Commercial Storage Facilities. The state
and federal constitutions afford no privacy protection to the common
area of a gated commercial storage facility.
State v. S.L., COA
No. 62157-2-I (Aug. 24, 2009).
Forfeiture. The beneficiaries of an estate
cannot assert an "innocent owner defense" to the forfeiture of a
parcel of real property that was seized prior to the owner’s death
based on the owner’s use of it for commercial marijuana production.
Pearson v. Snohomish County Regional
Drugs Task Force, COA No. 62933-6-I (Aug. 24,
2009).
Growth Management Act. Because the Whatcom
County Comprehensive Plan establishes the standards for service and
finds that the fire district has the capacity to meet that standard,
the fire district is foreclosed from evaluating concurrency with new
development on a project-by-project basis and requiring a
concurrency mitigation fee.
Birch Point Village, LLC v. Whatcom
County Fire Distric No. 21, COA No. 61431-2-I
(June 22, 2009, released for publication Aug. 24, 2009).
Division Two
Unit of Prosecution. The unit of
prosecution for witness tampering is an instance of attempting to
induce a witness or person to do any of the actions set forth in RCW
9A.72.120. Eight counts of witness tampering stemming from 36 phone
calls to the witness over a four day period , did not violate double
jeopardy.
State v. Thomas,
COA No. 37112-0-II (Aug. 25, 2009). Judge Van Deren dissented,
holding that the unit of prosecution is each witness, regardless of
the number of inducements.
Child Sex Abuse.
Competency of witness: A 6-year-old
child who has A.D.H.D. and who was confused about some of
the specific details about the incident, was competent to
testify at trial, based upon his ability to demonstrate that
he had an adequate memory of what the defendant did to him,
the mental capacity to relay the information in court, his
unwavering story regarding the defendant sucking "his
private parts", his ability to accurately testify about his
age, his home environment, and his birthday, his ability to
listen carefully to questions while testifying at the
competency hearing before trying to provide accurate
answers, and his testimony he knew the difference between a
truth and a lie and that he would get in trouble if he told
a lie.
Child Hearsay: The fact that a child
is in a "time out" for behavior unrelated to the sexual
abuse incident does not make it more likely that a child
would fabricate a statement about the defendant’s action.
A.D.H.D., emotional immaturity, or difficulty in describing
sequences of an event are not determinative of a child’s
general character or truthfulness.
Prior Misconduct Evidence: The
trial court properly admitted evidence of four uncharged
prior incidents of sexual misconduct with other minor
children under the "common plan or scheme" prong of ER
404(b). (Note: Court acknowledges the existence of RCW
10.58.090(1), but since Kennealy was tried prior to its
adoption and the State did not argue it applied, the Court
did not rely upon the statute in affirming the convictions.)
State v. Kennealy,
COA No. 37665-2-II (Aug. 25, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Good Faith and Gant. Application of
the good faith exception to exclusion to a properly preserved and/or
raised Gant claim is improper under the United Supreme
Court’s cases on retroactivity of new decisions.
United States v. Gonzalez,
No. 07-30098 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2009).
Execution of Search Warrants for Electronic
Data. In a sweeping en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit set
forth the procedure and rules governing the execution of federal
search warrants for electronic data. The specified procedure
includes the following:
"[T]he government should, in future
warrant applications, forswear reliance on the plain view
doctrine or any similar doctrine that would allow it to
retain data to which it has gained access only because it
was required to segregate seizable from non-seizable data.
If the government doesn’t consent to such a waiver, the
magistrate judge should order that the seizable and non-seizable
data be separated by an independent third party under the
supervision of the court, or deny the warrant altogether."
"[W]hile it is perfectly appropriate for
the warrant application to acquaint the issuing judicial
officer with the theoretical risks of concealment and
destruction of evidence, the government must also fairly
disclose the actual degree of such risks in the case
presented to the judicial officer. . . pledges [from the
holder of the data] of data retention are obviously highly
relevant in determining whether a warrant is needed at all
and, if so, what its scope should be. If the government
believes such pledges to be unreliable, it may say so and
explain why. But omitting such highly relevant information
altogether is inconsistent with the government’s duty of
candor in presenting a warrant application. A lack of candor
in this or any other aspect of thewarrant application shall
bear heavily against the government in the calculus of any
subsequent motion to return or suppress the seized data."
"[T]he process of sorting, segregating,
decoding and otherwise separating seizable data (as defined
by the warrant) from all other data must be designed to
achieve that purpose and that purpose only. Thus, if the
government is allowed to seize information pertaining to ten
names, the search protocol must be designed to discover data
pertaining to those names only, not to others, and not those
pertaining to other illegality."
"[T]he warrant application should
normally include, or the issuing judicial officer should
insert, a protocol for preventing agents involved in the
investigation from examining or retaining any data other
than that for which probable cause is shown. The procedure
might involve, as in this case, a requirement that the
segregation be done by specially trained computer personnel
who are not involved in the investigation. It should be made
clear that only those personnel may examine and segregate
the data. The government must also agree that such computer
personnel will not communicate any information they learn
during the segregation process absent further approval of
the court.
"At the discretion of the issuing
judicial officer, and depending on the nature and
sensitivity of the privacy interests involved, the computer
personnel in question may be government employees or
independent third parties not affiliated with the
government. The issuing judicial officer may appoint an
independent expert or special master to conduct or supervise
the segregation and redaction of the data. In a case such as
this one, where the party subject to the warrant is not
suspected of any crime, and where the privacy interests of
numerous other parties who are not under suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing are implicated by the search, the
presumption should be that the segregation of the data will
be conducted by, or under the close supervision of, an
independent third party selected by the court."
"Once the data has been segregated (and,
if necessary, redacted), the government agents involved in
the investigation may examine only the information covered
by the terms of the warrant. Absent further judicial
authorization, any remaining copies must be destroyed or, at
least so long as they may be lawfully possessed by the party
from whom they were seized, returned along with the actual
physical medium that may have been seized (such as a hard
drive or computer). The government may not retain copies of
such returned data, unless it obtains specific judicial
authorization to do so."
"[W]ithin a time specified in the
warrant, which should be as soon as practicable, the
government must provide the issuing officer with a return
disclosing precisely what data it has obtained as a
consequence of the search, and what data it has returned to
the party from whom it was seized. The return must include a
sworn certificate that the government has destroyed or
returned all copies of data that it is not entitled to keep.
If the government believes it is entitled to retain data as
to which no probable cause was shown in the original
warrant, it may seek a new warrant or justify the
warrantless seizure by some means other than plain view."
United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067 (9th Cir. Aug. 26,
2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR AUGUST 14, 2009
Division Two
Jury Coercion. A judge’s statement, upon
noting that one verdict form was blank, that "I'm sending the jury
back to the jury room. Verdict form No. 1 is completely blank. It
must be filled in.", violated CrR 6.15(f)(2). The defendant,
therefore, is entitled to a new trial on that count.
State v. Ford, COA
No. 37089-1-II (Aug. 11, 2009).
Medical Marijuana. The trial court erred
by barring the defendant from presenting a "primary caregiver"
affirmative defense to a manufacture of marijuana charge, because
there is nothing in Chapter 69.51A RCW that requires the "valid
documentation" to contain the exact language of the statute.
State v. Otis, COA
No. 37705-5-II (Aug. 11, 2009). [This opinion appears to be
inconsistent with Division Three’s opinion in State v. Shepherd,
110 Wn. App. 544, 41 P.3d 1235, review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1017
(2002)].
Tax Assessments. For tax purposes, power
generating equipment is personal property, not real property.
Grays Harbor Energy, LLC, v. Grays Harbor
County, COA No. 37163-4-II (Aug. 11, 2009).
Division Three
Gang Testimony. While gang affiliation may
establish the motive for a crime or to show that defendants acted in
concert, the admissibility of gang affiliation evidence depends upon
the establishment of a connection between the gang's purposes or
values and the offense committed.
State v. Scott, COA
No. 26790-3-III (Aug. 11, 2009).
Comparability. The rule that a defendant’s
affirmative acknowledgment at sentencing that an out-of-state
conviction is comparable to a Washington offense is binding upon
that defendant in Persistent Offender Accountability Act (three
strike) cases.
State v. Birch, COA
No. 26635-4-III (Aug. 11, 2009).
SSOSA. A defendant is not barred from
receiving a SSOSA sentence solely because he is subject to a
deportation hold.
State v. Adamy, COA
No. 27206-1-III (Aug. 13, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Counsel’s failure to consult an expert blood spatter expert prior to
trial, based upon counsel’s belief that the case was a "credibility
contest", constituted prejudicial deficient performance.
Richter v. Hickman,
No. (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2009).
Probable Cause and Child Sex Abuse. A
4-year-old’s statements that described sexual abuse the child
purportedly experienced at the age of 3 does not, on its own,
support a finding of probable cause if the information is not
reasonably trustworthy or reliable. Before an officer can make an
arrest upon such a statement, the officer must conduct further
investigation and obtain corroboration of the statements.
Stoot v. City of Everett,
No. 07-35425 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2009).
Fifth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Liability. A statement obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment must be "used" in a "criminal case" in order to give rise
to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Use" includes relying on the
statements in an affidavit of probable cause that is filed in
support of the information charging the defendant with a crime, and
the consideration of the statements at a pre-trial arraignment and
CrR 3.2 bail hearing.
Stoot v. City of Everett,
No. 07-35425 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR AUGUST 7, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
SSOSA Revocations. The State does not need
to prove that a defendant willfully violated the conditions of his
SSOSA sentence in order to revoke the SSOSA. The only conditions
that requires proof of willfulness is failure to pay legal financial
conditions and community service obligations.
State v. McCormick,
No. 81193-8 (Aug. 6, 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
DWLS 1. In determining the mandatory
minimum sentence for repeat DWLS 1 offenses, there is no temporal
limitation upon which convictions count as "priors." The rule of
lenity, however, provides a basis for allowing a trial court to
convert all or part of the minimum term of imprisonment to
electronic home monitoring.
State v. Anderson,
COA No. 61258-1-I (Aug. 3, 2009).
Stalking. Proof of two incidents of
harassment is sufficient to support a conviction for stalking. The
stalking statute, moreover, is not unconstitutionally vague. Double
jeopardy is not violated by convicting and sentencing someone for
violating both the stalking statute and the harassment statute.
State v. Haines, COA
No. 61858-0-I (Aug. 3, 2009).
Division Two
Third Degree Assault. A floor can be an
"instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm."
State v. Marhol, COA
No. 37566-4-II (Aug. 4, 2009).
Gant Challenges. A defendant who
did not move to suppress evidence based upon Gant in the
trial court, may not assert a Gant challenge for the first
time on appeal.
State v. Milan, COA
No. 37172-3-II (Aug. 7, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Tribal Roadblocks. A roadblock on a
public right-of-way within tribal territory, established on tribal
authority, is permissible only to the extent that the suspicionless
stop of non-Indians is limited to the amount of time, and the nature
of inquiry, that can establish whether or not they are Indians. When
obvious violations, such as alcohol impairment, are found, detention
on tribal authority for delivery to state officers is authorized.
But inquiry going beyond Indian or non-Indian status, or including
searches for evidence of crime, are not authorized on purely tribal
authority in the case of non-Indians.
Bressi v. Ford, No.
(9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2009).
Prison Litigation Reform Act. A person,
who is no longer incarcerated, need not exhaust administrative
remedies pursuant to the PLRA as a prerequisite to filing an action
in the district court relating to the conditions of his
incarceration.
Talamantes v. Leyva,
No. 06-55939 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR JULY
31, 2009
Division One
Custodial Sexual Misconduct. "Being detained" for purposes
of the custodial sexual misconduct law means "restraint on freedom
of movement to such a degree that a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave."
State v. Torres, COA
No. 61616-1-I (Jul. 27, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JULY 24, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Community Custody. When a defendant is
sentenced to a term of confinement and community custody that has
the potential to exceed the statutory maximum for the crime, the
appropriate remedy is to remand to the trial court to amend the
sentence and explicitly state that the
combination of confinement and community custody
shall not exceed the statutory maximum.
In Re PRP of Brooks,
No. 80704-3 (Jul. 23, 2009). [Editor’s Note: This case essentially
overrules State v. Linerud, 147 Wn. App. 944, 197 P.3d 1224
(2008), which held that such language constituted an illegal
indeterminate sentence.]
Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy is
violated when a defendant is convicted for both rape of a child in
the second degree and rape in the second degree based on incapacity
to consent arising from one act of sexual intercourse with a child.
State v. Hughes, No.
81270-5 (Jul. 23, 2009).
Exceptional Sentences. Exceptional minimum
term sentences under RCW 9.94A.712 after the effective date of the "Blakely
fix" still do not require a jury finding of aggravating
circumstances.
State v. Hughes, No.
81270-5 (Jul. 23, 2009).
Division One
Personal Restraint Petitions. A trial
counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence under a theory that
was adopted by case law after the defendant’s trial was concluded,
will not support relief in a PRP.
In re Personal Restraint of Nichols,
COA No. 59750-7-I (Jul. 20, 2009).
Division Two
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. In a
PRP, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failing to raise a constitutional error or fundamental
defect at trial must show that he was actually and substantially
prejudiced by the error and that the legal issue had merit. As to
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must
also demonstrate that he was actually and substantially prejudiced
by the error.
In re Personal Restraint of Davis,
COA No. 35706-2-II (Jul. 21, 2009).
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender.
California convictions for lewd acts on a child
are not comparable to Washington sex offenses,
and thus, will not support a prosecution for failing to register as
a sex offender. A California conviction for failing to register as a
sex offender in California that was based upon an underlying sex
offense that is not comparable to a Washington sex offense will also
not support a prosecution for failing to register as a sex offender.
State v. Howe, COA
No. 37361-1-II (Jul. 21, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Confrontation Clause. A defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights are not violated where limitations on
the effectiveness of cross-examination resulted from the witness’s
own physical impairments.
Vasquez v. Kirkland,
Cause No. 08-55699 (9th Cir. Jul. 20, 2009).
Computer Searches. A search warrant for an
item that is capable of being stored on a computer harddrive does
not allow the searchers to access the computer. A searcher may only
access a computer when the search warrant expressly authorizes a
computer search. Officers seeking records under a warrant that lacks
such express authorization may secure the computer at the scene,
while they apply for a second search warrant.
United States v. Payton,
No. 07-10557 (9th Cir. Jul. 21, 2009). [Editor’s note: This opinion
conflicts with a prior Ninth Circuit opinion. See United States
v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008). Hopefully, the
conflict will be addressed by the en banc court.)
Public Employees and First Amendment. A
police officer’s conversations with superiors and assistant district
attorneys discussing investigations into crimes or corruption within
or concerning the police department and his testimony before a grand
jury are clearly pursuant to his employment, and does not constitute
"protected speech" which will support a First Amendment claim
against his employer.
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg,
No. 06-17362 (9th Cir. Jul. 21, 2009).
Ethnic Generalizations. It is
prosecutorial error to elicit testimony from an information and
police officer regarding which ethnic groups typically fill which
roles in the pseudoephedrine pill trade, and to then argue that this
information supports the guilt of the defendants.
United States v. Nobari,
No. 06-10465 (9th Cir. Jul. 24, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JULY 17, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Land Use Permits. A government entity
cannot, under the Washington Constitution, apply a moratorium to
refuse to consider a permit request from a religious organization.
In the context of homeless tent cities, governments may mediate
concerns for safety, noise, and crime but may not outright deny
consideration of permitting.
City of Woodinville v. Northshore United
Church of Christ, No. 80588-1 (Jul. 16, 2009).
Justice Sanders authored a
concurring opinion.
Division One
Public Records Act. The Pierce County
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office did not violate the public records act
by withholding records contained in a specific file under the CR 26
definition of work product. A letter from the prosecuting attorney’s
office that explains that a certain number of pages of police
reports and witness interview transcripts are being withheld as work
product because they pertained to the charging decision is
sufficient to satsify PAWS. The Pierce County Prosecuting
Attorney’s Office did not have to coordinate with the Sheriff’s
Department to obtain the withheld records for the requester.
Koenig v. Pierce County,
COA No. 61821-1 - I (Jul. 13, 2009).
Legal Financial Obligations. A defendant
was entitled to be relieved of all responsibility for paying his
LFOs on a 1992 conviction as the 10-year statutory period for
collecting the money under the prior statute expired in 2002. The
bench warrant for the defendant’s failure to pay that was issued in
1995 did not toll the collection period and did not extend the trial
court’s jurisdiction.
Personal Restraint Petition of Spires,
COA No. 61883-1 - I (Jul. 13, 2009).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Because
the decision to seek an acquittal instead of requesting a jury
instruction on a lesser included offense can be characterized as
legitimate trial strategy, a defendant cannot overcome the
presumption that his counsel was competent solely because counsel
did not seek an instruction on a lesser included offense.
State v. Hassan, COA
No. 61756-7 - I (Jul. 13, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JULY 9, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Burglary. A large, partially fenced yard
does not qualify as a "fenced area" under the burglary statute.
State v. Engel, No.
81072-9 (Jul. 9, 2009).
DWLS. The post-City of Redmond v. Moore
statutes afford adequate due process to a person who seeks to
challenge his or her driver’s license suspension for failure to
appear, respond, pay, or comply with a notice of traffic citation.
City of Bellevue v. Lee,
No. 81473-2 (Jul. 9, 2009). Justice Sanders was the
lone dissenter.
Sexually Violent Predators. A convicted
sex offender’s acts of engaging in sex with vulnerable and
developmentally disabled co-patients, while institutionalized at
Western State Hospital, satisfies the "recent overt act" requirement
of former RCW 71.09.020(10) (2006), recodified as RCW 71.09.020(12).
While SVP detainees are not entitled to an unlimited number of
experts at state expense, the trial court abused its discretion by
not granting this detainee’s request for appointment of a second
expert.
In Re Detention of Anderson,
No. 79111-2 (Jul. 9, 2009). Justice Sanders authored a
dissenting opinion regarding
the "recent overt act" issue. Justice Fairhurst authored a
separate dissenting opinion
on the same issue.
On Tuesday, July 7, 2009, the Washington Supreme
Court granted review in the following cases:
First Degree Arson. State v. Bainard
, No. 82699-4. Chelan County. COA opinion is reported at
148 Wn. App. 93 (2009). Whether the dead bodies of murder
victims are "human beings" for purposes of first degree arson?
(State’s petition for review).
Possession of a Controlled Substance With
Intent to Deliver. State v. Sanchez and State v. Valencia
Sanchez, No. 82731-1. Clark County. COA opinion is
reported at 148 Wn. App. 302 (2009). Whether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
Sexual Misconduct With a Minor. State
v. Hirschfelder, No. 82744-3. Grays Harbor County.
COA opinion is reported at 148 Wn. App. 328 (2009). Did the
pre-2009 version of the sexual misconduct with a minor statute
include offenses committed with 18-year-old enrolled students?
(State’s petition for review).
Closing Argument. State v. Monday,
No. 82736-2. King County. Granted on issue of whether
prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial
and whether imposition of firearms enhancements voided the
defendant's jury trial rights & Williams-Walker issues COA
opinion is unpublished.
Open Courts. State v.Irby, No.
82665-0. Skagit County. COA opinion is unpublished.
Whether an e-mail exchange between the court and counsel
regarding the release of certain jurors prejudicially violated
the defendant’s right to be present. (State’s petition for
review.)
Truancy. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S.,
No. 83024-0. COA opinion is reported at 148 Wn. App. 205 (2009).
State’s petition for review is granted, but the motion for
accelerated review is denied. Whether a child has a
constitutional right to counsel at the preliminary hearing on
the truancy petition.
Public Records Act. Ameriquest
Mortgage Co. v. Att'y Gen., No. 82690-1. Granted on federal
preemption issue only. COA opinion is reported at 148 Wn. App.
145 (2009). Whether
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 6801 et seq., preempted the Public Records Act and prohibited
disclosure of the customer loan files.
Certificate of Need. Overlake Hosp.
Ass'n & Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State Dep't of Health,
No. 82728-1. COA opinion is reported at 148 Wn. App. 1 (2008).
Limited Liability Corporations and
Dissenter’s Rights Suits. Humphrey Indus. LTD v. Clay St.
Assocs. LLC , No. 82687-1. COA opinion is unpublished.
Residential Construction Lawsuits.
Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., No. 82812-1. COA opinion
reported at 147 Wn. App. 193 (2008). Grant only on Homeowners'
issue of economic loss & assignment of warranty
Division One
Cross-Examination of Defendant. Const.
art. I, § 22, provides no greater protection to a criminal defendant
then does the federal constitution with respect to a prosecutor’s
cross-examination of the defendant concerning the defendant’s
opportunity to tailor his testimony to evidence previously
introduced at trial.
State v. Martin, COA
No. 61127-5-I (Jul. 6. 2009).
Bail Jumping. Bail jumping is classified
for sentencing purposes according to the nature of the underlying
charge at the time the defendant jumps bail, not on the basis of the
underlying charge's ultimate disposition.
State v. Coucil, COA
No. 61731-1-I (Jul. 6, 2009).
Money Laundering. Defendant is entitled to
a new trial where the "to convict" instruction did not specify the
two pieces of property that supported the charges and the jury heard
testimony regarding uncharged pieces of property.
State v. Jain, COA
No. 61412-6-I (Jul. 6, 2009). [Editor’s note– This opinion contains
a nice review of the law related to "to convict" instructions.]
Division Two
Community Custody. A defendant is not
entitled to have excess time spent in prison credited toward his
community custody term.
State v. Jones, COA
No. 37002-6-II (Jul. 7, 2009). [Editor’s note: This opinion
represents a clear split with Division Three’s opinion in In re
Pers. Restraint of Knippling, 144 Wn. App. 639, 183 P.3d 365
(2008).]
Ninth Circuit
Summary Judgment. The "sham affidavit"
rule does not apply when the non-moving party resists summary
judgment by pointing to deposition testimony given under oath by
other percipient witnesses whose testimony differed from that of
thenon-moving party’s deposition testimony.
Nelson v. City of Davis,
No. 07-16905 (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2009). [Editor’s note: This opinion
has a nice summary of the "sham affidavit" doctrine.]
Pro Se. A slight error in stating the
maximum sentence will not invalidate a waiver of counsel, where the
defendant was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to trial
and the defendant chose to continue to represent himself. No
specific language must be used to advise the defendant of the risks
and dangers of proceeding pro se.
United States v. Gerritsen,
No. 06-50552 (9th Cir. Jul. 10, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JULY 2, 2009
Division Two
Gang Evidence. Admitting gang evidence to
establish motive in a prosecution for first degree murder by extreme
indifference was proper under ER 404(b). Gang evidence was also
probative with respect to the defendant’s intent to commit great
bodily injury as charged in the first degree assault count. Gang
evidence will generally not satisfy the identity alternative of ER
404(b). The gang expert’s response to hypothetical questions did not
invade the province of the jury. Double jeopardy is not violated by
the imposition of an exceptional sentence on a first degree murder
by extreme indifference conviction based on the aggravating factor
that the murder involved a destructive and foreseeable impact on
persons other than the victim.
State v. Yarbough,
COA No. 36457-3-II (Jun. 30, 2009).
Closing Arguments. The following statement
that was made at the end of a 5-page closing argument did not
constitute a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent and
did not shift the burden of proof: "What I'm asking you to do is to
deliberate that there has been no real contradiction on any of these
facts and to come back with a verdict of guilty."
State v. Morris, COA
No. 36923-1-II (Jun. 30, 2009).
Collateral Attacks. A supplemental brief
that contains a new issue and that is filed more than one year after
the challenged conviction became final is time barred. A
transcriptionist’s mistake does not provide a basis for equitably
tolling the one-year time bar contained in RCW 10.73.090.
Petitioner’s open court room challenge is rejected because he
explicitly agreed to the courtroom’s closure and he cannot
demonstrate actual prejudice from the closure. A court should look
only at whether a prosecutor’s conduct was improper and likely to
cause prejudice at the time the prosecutor acted, rather than
viewing the conduct through the distorting effects of hindsight. The
doctrine of prosecutorial misconduct does not apply to police
action. A police officers use of some deception during an
investigation does not constitute outrageous government conduct.
In re Personal Restraint of Wiatt,
COA No. 35690-2-II (Jun. 30, 2009). Judge Van Deren dissented with
respect to the open courtroom issue.
Division Three
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. A defendant,
who failed to disclose his juvenile offense history at the time of
his guilty plea, is contractually bound by the plea agreement to
accept the increased offender score for juvenile offenses that do
not wash out under current law.
State v. Robinson,
COA No. 27120-0-III (Jul. 2, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JUNE 26, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Crawford. The Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation is violated by the admission of a certificate from
a state laboratory analyst which states that material seized by the
police and connected with the petitioner is a controlled substance.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
No. 07-591 (June 25, 2009).
School Searches. A search of a school child’s
outer clothing and backpack based upon plausible information that
the student was violating the school’s drug rules was proper, but
the search of the child’s underwear violated the Fourth Amendment.
Safford United School Dist. #1 v.
Redding, No. 08-479 (June 25, 2009).
Division One
Public Records Act. A citizen’s oral request
for information at a public meeting is not a sufficiently clear
request under the Public Records Act to trigger sanctions for
failing to respond to the request within five days.
Beal v. City of Seattle,
COA No. 62171-8-I (June 22, 2009).
Division Two
Closing Argument. A prosecutor does not vouch
for his witnesses by reminding the jury that it is the sole judge of
credibility, by outlining the evidence that would support a jury
determination that the State’s witnesses were credible, and that the
defendant’s witnesses were not credible. The State does not shift
the burden of proof to the defendant by arguing that a defense
witnesses’ testimony is unreasonable in the context of all the other
evidence.
State v. Jackson, COA
No. 37585-1-II (June 23, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Blakely. A state court’s determination
that the "prior conviction" exception to thegeneral rule that a
sentencing judge may not make factual findings that increase the
statutory maximum criminal penalty includes a determination that the
instant offense was committed while the defendant was on probation
for a prior offense, will not be upset by the Ninth Circuit in a
habeas proceeding.
Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers,
No. 07-56153 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009).
Sexually Violent Predators. A pending
detainer in one state will not invalidate a sex offender’s civil
commitment in another state.
Smith v. Richards,
No. 07-35857 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009).
DNA Collection. The forcible collection,
without a court order or warrant, of a DNA sample from an
individual, who was convicted of a crime in another state and who
did not fall within the parameters of the post-conviction DNA
collection statutes, for entry into a cold case data bank
constitutes a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment that may give
rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Friedman v. Boucher,
No. 05-15675 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009). Judge Callahan authored a
strong dissent.
Street Performers. Seattle rules governing street artist
behavior at the Seattle Center do not survive a First Amendment
challenge as lawful "time, place, and manner" restrictions.
Berger v. City of Seattle,
No. 05-35752 (9th Cir. June 24, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JUNE 19, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Post Conviction DNA Testing. A convicted
person has no constitutional right of access to evidence for
post-conviction DNA testing.
District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne,
No. 08-6 (June 18, 2009).
Double Jeopardy. An apparent inconsistency
between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure
to return a verdict on other counts does not affect the acquittals’
preclusive effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. When the jury
hangs on some counts, the government is not necessarily permitted to
retry the defendant on those counts. Retrial will be barred when the
government would be required to prove an issue that was necessarily
resolved in the acquittal.
Yeager v. United States,
No. 08-67 (June 18, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Crawford. The deceased victim’s
statements to police officers were testimonial, as the record made
when this case was tried does not establish that the police officers
were seeking information to respond to an ongoing emergency or to
obtain information designed to enable officers to immediately end a
threatening situation.
State v. Koslowski,
No. 80427-3 (June 18, 2009). Justice Sanders
concurred. Chief Justice
Alexander authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division Two
Mandatory Joinder. CrR 4.3.1 requires the
dismissal of a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm stemming
from acts committed in 2004, when the defendant was previously
convicted of unlawfully possessing the same firearm for acts
committed in 2005.
State v. Kenyon, COA
No. 37435-8-II (June 16, 2009).
Land Use. The Pierce County Hearing
Examiner had the power to compel the Ciyt of Puyallup to provide
water for commercial purposes to a property located outside the
urban boundary that was already receiving water for residential
purposes from the city..
Stanzel v. City of Puyallup,
COA No. 37697-1-II (June 16, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Prosecutorial Immunity. A prosecutor is
entitled to absolute immunity in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, for not identifying and petitioning for the release of every
inmate serving a sentence pursuant to a statute that has been
declared unconstitutionally vague. Depending upon state statutes,
such a prosecutor may still be liable for a state law claim of false
imprisonment.
Cousins v. Lockyer,
No. 07-17216 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JUNE 12, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Judicial Bias. The due process clause was
violated when a state supreme court justice sat on a case involving
the financial interests of a major donor to the judge’s election
campaign.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal,
No. 08-22 (June 8, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Post Conviction DNA Testing. RCW
1073.170(2)(a)(iii) allows for post-conviction DNA when the DNA
testing now requested would provide "significant new information."
The Court holds that "significant new information" includes DNA test
results that did not exist at the time of trial and that are
material to the perpetrator's identity, regardless of whether DNA
testing could have been performed at trial. Post-conviction DNA
testing is properly denied where the results will not raise a
probability, in light of all of the evidence, of the defendant’s
innocence.
State v. Riofta,
No. 79407-3 (June 11, 2009). Justice Charles Johnson
dissents, arguing that the
Court has interpreted the statute too rigorously. Justice Chambers
separately
dissented to urge the
Legislature to "take action."
Aggravated First Degree Murder. When a
jury is convened solely to determine whether the defendant
personally committed one or more of the aggravating circumstances in
RCW 10.95.020, it is proper for the judge to instruct the jury that
the defendant has been convicted of the crime of murder in the first
degree and that the finding of guilt should not be considered as
proof of the aggravating factors.
State v. Thomas, No.
80643-8 (June 11, 2009). Justice Sanders agreed that a jury could be
empaneled to determine the existence of the aggravating
circumstances, but that the jury instructions used were improper.
Thus, he
dissented on this issue and
on the majority’s resolution of a Batson claim.
Division One
Violation of Protection Orders. A
passenger, who is charged with violating a protection order, does
not have standing to object to an officer’s questioning a driver
about the identity of the driver’s passengers. The spousal
testimonial privilege does not allow a defendant, who is charged
with violating a protection order, to keep the victim spouse off the
stand.
State v. Shuffelen,
COA No. 61963-2-I (April 13, 2009, publication ordered June 8,
2009).
Interpretation of DNA Results. A Frye
hearing is not required with respect to the interpretation of
mixed-source DNA profiles, or the statitistical probabilities
calculated by the PE method from such mixed-source DNA profiles. The
counting method is acceptable for interpreting YSTR test results.
State v. Bander, COA
No. 61125-9-I (June 8, 2009).
Mentally Ill Offenders. An impaired
ability to form intent is not a defense to a crime, if the State
establishes that the defendant actually intended to commit the
charged act. Testimony regarding "moral reasoning" is properly
excluded in an insanity trial, because in an insanity case, "it is
society's morals, and not the individual's morals, that are the
standard for judging moral wrong. Sentencing a persistent offender,
who suffers from a mental disorder, to life without the possibility
of release, does not violate the prohibition upon cruel and unusual
punishment.
State v. Johnson, COA
No. 60197-1-I (June 8, 2009).
Horn Honking. A duly enacted ordinance
proscribing the honking of a horn for other than public safety
reasons is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Horn
honking per se is neither expressive conduct nor speech that is
protected by the First Amendment.
State v. Immelt, COA
No. 60991-2-I (June 8, 2009).
Division Two
"To Convict Instructions." A "to convict"
jury instruction in an attempted first degree murder case is
adequate if it follows the format of WPIC 100.02. The "to convict"
instruction does not have to include a premeditation element.
State v. Reed, COA
No. 36407-7-II (June 10, 2009).
Vouching. The prosecutor does not
improperly vouch for a witnesses credibility by offering into
evidence a plea agreement that requires the witness to testify
truthfully.
State v. Ish, COA
No.36562-6-II (June 10, 2009). (This opinion represents a
disagreement with Division One’s opinion of State v. Green,
119 Wn. App. 15, 24, 79 P.3d 460 (2003).)
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Counsel
in a three-strike case was ineffective for failing to determine the
comparability of the defendant’s Kentucky sex abuse conviction. The
Kentucky conviction, which was for sexual contact with the
defendant’s 7-year-old niece, was not comparable to Washington’s
first degree child molestation, as the Kentucky offense did not
require proof that the then, 25-year-old defendant was more than
24-months older than the victim and was not married to the victim.
In re Personal Restraint of Crawford,
COA No. 37237-1-II (June 10, 2009). Judge Penoyer dissented.
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JUNE 5, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
On June 2, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court
granted review in the following cases:
Search Incident to Arrest. State v. Afana,
No. 82600-5. Spokane County. Request of identification from a
passenger in a parked car. "Grant and direct parties to address
Gant." COA opinion reported at 147 Wn. App. 843 (2008).
RALJ Appeals. State v. Osman, No.
82671-4. King County. Whether the missing portion of an
electronic record is significant or material under RALJ 5.4. COA
opinion reported at 147 Wn. App. 867 (2008).
Unit of Prosecution. State v. Hall,
No. 82558-1. King County. What is the correct unit of
prosecution for witness tampering. COA opinion reported at 147 Wn.
App. 485 (2008)
Rape Shield. State v. Jones, No.
82613-7. Benton County. This case involves whether the rape
shield statute bars evidence that the victim consented to have sex
with others in the same incident as the offense the defendant is
charged with, and whether a trial judge may exclude evidence under
ER 404(b) if the judge finds the proposed evidence is not credible.
COA opinion is unpublished.
Privacy Act. State v. Patel, No.
82649-8. Spokane County. Instant messaging and privacy act.
COA opinion is unpublished.
Attorney Fees. McGuire v. Bates,
No. 82659-5. Whether the customer is the prevailing party. COA
opinion reported at 147 Wn. App. 751 (2008).
Mobile Home Communities. Little Mtn.
Estates Tenants Ass'n v. Little Mtn. Estates MHC LLC, No.
82574-2. COA opinion is unpublished.
Division One
Sexually Violent Predators. Unlawful
custody, by itself, is not a jurisdictional impediment to a valid
petition for commitment under the SVPA. An SVP committee may only be
relieved of a stipulation if the stipulation was not entered into
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. When the stipulation is
in writing, includes a list of the rights the detainee is waiving,
and there is an in-court colloquy, the detainee will have a near
impossible burden to overcome.
Detention of Scott,
COA No. 61121-6 -I (June 1, 2009).
Extradition. An alleged fugitive must be
competent to participate in an interstate extradition proceeding.
The level of competency needed, however, is limited. The alleged
fugitive need only be able to consult her lawyer as to her identity
and her status as a fugitive.
In re Personal Restraint of Liu,
COA No. 62820-8-I (June 1, 2009).
Double Jeopardy. Convictions for
possession of methamphetamine and maintaining a vehicle for drug
trafficking do not violate double jeopardy, as the latter crime has
an element that is not present in the former crime and different
mens rea, and these separate elements required different supporting
evidence even if all facts supporting his convictions generally
arose from the same course of conduct or circumstances.
State v. Marin, COA
No. 61262-0-I (June 1, 2009).
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. A
sex offender who lacks a fixed residence and who fails to report
weekly as required by the statute may, regardless of the number of
weekly reporting sessions missed, only be charged with one count of
failing to register under former RCW 9A.44.130(11)(a).
State v. Durrett, COA
No. 60728-6-I (June 1, 2009). Judge Ellington
dissented solely on the
Linerud issue.
Reasonable Doubt Instruction. It is
reversible error for a trial court to give any reasonable doubt
instruction other than WPIC 4.01.
State v. Castillo,
COA No. 61867-9-I (June 1, 2009).
Double Jeopardy. Because the proof
required to establish the intimidating a witness charge did not
establish the felony harassment charge, the two convictions were not
for the same offense and did not subject the defendant to double
jeopardy.State
v. Fuentes, COA No. 61319-7-I (June 1, 2009).
Forfeiture. Notice of appearances from the
property owner’s attorneys that are served on counsel for seizing
entity are sufficient to comply with RCW 69.50.505(5).
Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force v.
Jain, COA No. 60312-4-I (June 1, 2009).
Division Two
Opinion. While a sexual assault nurse
examiner’s opinion that the victim’s physical injuries were of the
type you would expect to see in a non-consensual sexual encounter
might be proper, testimony that "‘the nature and cause of [the
victim’s] injuries’ was that ‘[t]hey're extensive injury related to
nonconsensual sex’" and that "‘this was a very traumatic
nonconsensual . . . penetration’" constituted an improper opinion of
guilt.
State v. Hudson, COA
No. 36642-8-II (June 2, 2009). Judge Penoyer dissented.
Gang Testimony. Gang testimony should not
have been admitted in this murder trial, as the State did not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged gang existed.
State v. Asaeli, COA
No. 35269-9-II (April 27, 2009, publication ordered June 2, 2009).
Powerpoint and Closing Arguments.
Powerpoint slides used during closing argument will be scrutinized
for possible misstatements of the law.
State v. Asaeli, COA
No. 35269-9-II (April 27, 2009, publication ordered June 2, 2009).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Counsel’s failure to request lesser included instructions on
manslaughter constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as the
evidence of intentional murder was "sparse," a failed self-defense
claim can support manslaughter, and the penalties between
manslaughter and murder are significant.
State v. Grier, COA
No. 36350-0-II (June 2, 2009).
Tax Foreclosure. RCW 84.64.080 is intended
to protect the treasurer in paying out tax sale proceedings and not
to determine ownership or prevent a tax-delinquent property owner
from selling his or her interests. When a challenge arises as to the
ownership of any "overage", the trial court is to determine who
actually owned the property at the time of the sale and is to
release the overage to that person.
Stephenson v. Cumulative, LLC,
COA No. 37738-1-II (June 2, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR MAY 29, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Confessions. Overruling Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986), the Court holds that police
may contact a defendant, who was appointed counsel at arraignment
without a formal request for counsel, to see if the defendant wishes
to answer questions. The proper administration of Miranda
warnings, coupled with a voluntary waiver of the rights by the
defendant, can yield an admissible statement.
Montejo v. Louisiana,,
No. 07-1529 (May 26, 2009). [Editor’s note: Wash. Const. art.
I, § 9 is co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment. This case should,
therefore, be binding on Washington Courts. See, e.g., State v.
Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100 (2008); State v. Radcliffe, 164
Wn.2d 900 (2008). ]
Washington Supreme Court
Frisks. An officer exceeds the permissible
scope of a frisk by squeezing an item once he determines that the
item does not contain a weapon. "[I]t is unlawful for officers to
continue squeezing -- whether in one slow motion or several -- after
they have determined a suspect does not have a weapon, to find
whether the suspect is carrying drugs or other contraband.
State v. Garvin, No.
80941-1 (May 28, 2009).
Division One
Domestic Violence Allegation. It is
neither necessary nor advisable to inform the jury that charges have
been designated as domestic violence crimes under chapter 10.99 RCW.
State v. Hagler, COA
No. 61107-1-I (May 26, 2009). Judge Ellington
dissented on a separate
issue.
Writs of Review. A writ of certiorari is
available to the prosecution to correct errors of law.
City of Seattle v. Holifield,
COA No. 61679-0-I (May 26, 2009).
CrRLJ 8.3(b). Suppression of evidence is not
an available remedy under CrRLJ 8.3(b).
City of Seattle v. Holifield,
COA No. 61679-0-I (May 26, 2009).
Impact Fees. A developer is not entitled
to a full exemption from park impact fees whenever the developer
previously contributed any land or money for parks pursuant to a
condition of plat approval.
City of Bellingham v. Woods,
COA No. 62041-0-I (May 26, 2009).
Division Two
Attempted Rape of a Child. Evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction of attempted rape of a child
where the defendant took many substantial steps toward completing
the crime by: (1) entering the victim’s bedroom; (2) closing the
bedroom door; (3) putting a knee on the bed; (4) unzipping his
pants; (5) taking out his penis; (6) presenting his penis to the
victim; (7) grabbing the victim’s buttocks and leaning to within
6-inches of the victim’s mouth with his penis exposed; and (8)
telling the victim to perform oral sex on him -- not once, but
twice.
State v. White, COA
No. 37263-1-II (May 27, 2009).
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. A defendant who
entered an Alford plea to a rape of a child charge in 2001 is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claimed "newly discovered
evidence" of witness recantation. The motion for new trial is not
untimely as the witnesses were difficult to locate.
State v. Scott, COA
No. 36846-3-II (May 27, 2009).
Violation of No Contact Orders. Double
jeopardy does not bar convictions for two counts of violating a
domestic violence no contact order based upon two non-threatening
e-mails that were sent on different dates but read by the victim on
the same date. These offenses are deemed committed on the day the
defendant sent the e-mails. Thus, they do not constitute "same
criminal conduct."
State v. Allen, COA
No. 36868-4-II (May 27, 2009).
Juvenile Sentencing. While double jeopardy
did not bar convictions for both first degree robbery and first
degree assault, the juvenile offender may be entitled to a reduced
sentence for these two convictions pursuant to RCW 13.40.180(1).
State v. S.S.Y.,
COA No. 37250-9-II (May 27, 2009).
Division Three
Forfeiture. Money that is seized in an
illegal search may be considered by the forfeiture court for the
limited purpose of establishing its existence, and the court's in
rem jurisdiction over it. The question in the forfeiture action then
becomes whether there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a
finding that the money was used for or gained from drug sales
City of Walla Walla v. Ibarra-Raya,
COA No. 26243-0-III (May 28, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Name Clearing. Oregon’s governor was entitled to qualified
immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based upon his making
stigmatizing statements in two press releases without providing the
stigmatized employees with name-clearing hearings
Tibbetts v. Kulongoski,
No. 07-36067 (9th Cir. May 29, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MAY 22, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Transferred Intent. Under the first degree assault
statute, RCW 9A.36.011, intent to inflict great bodily harm
transfers to an unintended victim who is uninjured and who the
defendant did not know was present.
State v. Elmi , No.
80380-3 (May 21, 2009). Justice Madsen authored the
dissenting opinion.
Ninth Circuit
Brady. Defendant was granted a new trial based upon
the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the star witnesses’ criminal
and arrest history. Prosecutor testified that he had no recollection
of what he disclosed to defense counsel and that he did not recall
what information the investigative officer provided to the
prosecutor in response to the prosecutor’s request that the officer
obtain the criminal history of the witness. The court states that:
where the prosecutor states either that he cannot remember or
does not know what information his agents relayed to him, the
government’s burden is not met. Allowing such convenient and
conclusory testimony to defeat a Brady claim would render
a defendant’s right to obtain Brady material meaningless.
United States v. Price,
No. 05-30323 (9th Cir. May 21, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MAY 15, 2009
Division One
Witness Tampering. A witness who is the target of witness
tampering suffers injury by being unduly pressured to act illegally
and is therefore a victim. Thus, each witness that is the subject of
witness tampering is "separate criminal conduct" for purposes of
calculating the offender score.
State v. Victoria,
COA No. 61602-1-I (May 11, 2009).
Division Two
Rape. A defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel in a rape in the second degree trial, for engaging in sexual
intercourse with another person when the victim was incapable of
consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally
incapacitated, when his counsel failed to propose a jury instruction
on the "reasonable belief" defense, RCW 9A.44.030(1).
State v. Powell, COA
No. 37122-7-II (May 12, 2009).
Lay Opinion Testimony. A police officer may not render a
lay opinion that the person on the surveillance tape is the
defendant when that opinion is based solely upon the police
officer’s contacts with the defendant on the day of the crime.
State v. Wahsise, COA
No. 36039-0-II (May 12, 2009).
Public Trials. The conducting of portions of pre-trial
proceedings and voir dire without consideration of the Bone-Club
factors was reversible error.
State v. Heath, COA
No. 36885-4-II (May 12, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MAY 8, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
At-Risk Youth. A juvenile court is required to find all
statutory contempt sanctions, remedial and punitive, inadequate
before resorting to its inherent power. Further, that finding of
inadequacy requires a juvenile court to try all statutory contempt
sanctions and specifically find
them ineffective before a court can exercise its inherent
contempt powers to sanction a youth. Before a juvenile court imposes
a punitive contempt sanction, full criminal due process protections
attach. Inpatient treatment is an invalid purge condition on an
otherwise punitive sanction.
In Re Interest of Silva,
No. 81573-9 (May 7, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring opinion.
Slayer Statute. A finding of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" is not a complete defense to the slayer statute. An action
under the slayer statute is civil, and the determination of whether
a slaying was willful and unlawful must be made in civil court
notwithstanding the result of any criminal case. A finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity does not make an otherwise unlawful act
lawful.
In Re Matter of Kissinger,
No. 81328-1 (May 7, 2009).
Division Two
Closing Argument. The prosecutor shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant by improperly arguing that the defendant
should have produced her passenger in a possession of
methamphetamine prosecution, as there was no evidence that the
passenger was under the control of the defendant and the passenger’s
absence could be explained by the passenger’s desire not to
incriminate himself. The prosecutor also improperly commented on the
defendant’s right to remain silent.
State v. Dixon, COA
No. 37553-2-II (May 5, 2009). Judge Hunt dissented, finding that
reversal was not required.
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MAY 1, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Brady. Suppressed witness
statements that corroborated the defendant’s trial position that he
habitually used excessive amounts of drugs, that his addiction
affected his behavior during the murders, and that the State’s
contrary arguments were false and misleading, would not sustain his
insanity defense as his behavior before, during and after the crimes
was inconsistent with the contention that he lacked substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform it to the requirements of law. The suppressed evidence may
have influenced the jury’s sentencing recommendation, so a remand to
the lower court to fully consider whether the evidence might have
been material to the jury’s assessment of the proper punishment
(death or life) is proper.
Cone v. Bell, No.
07-1114 (Apr. 28, 2009).
Sixth Amendment. A defendant’s statement
to a jailhouse informant, that was elicited in violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, was admissible to impeach his
inconsistent testimony at trial.
Kansas v. Ventris,
No. 07-1356 (Apr. 29, 2009). [Editor’s note– The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers requested that the Court
craft a broader exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements
obtained by jailhouse snitches because such snitches are so
"inherently unreliable." The Court rejected this request, stating
that "[o]ur legalsystem, however, is built on the premise that it is
the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing
witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid "establish[ing] this
Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of
criminal procedure." Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 564 (1967). It
would be especially inappropriate to fabricate such a rule in this
case, where it appears the jury took to heart the trial judge’s
cautionary instruction on the unreliability of rewarded informant
testimony by acquitting Ventris of felony murder."]
Washington Supreme Court
Persistent Offenders. A superior court
judgment and sentence for a strike offense that indicated the
defendant was under the age of 18 when the offense was committed is
insufficient proof of the former strike, unless accompanied by proof
that the superior court properly had jurisdiction over the offense.
For crimes that are nor included in the auto-adult jurisdiction
list, the State will generally need to produce the juvenile court’s
Kent factor decline order.
State v. Knippling,
No. 80848-1 (Apr. 30, 2009).
Preservation of Error. The defendant
failed to preserve his ER 404(b) objection for appeal and has failed
to demonstrate any manifest constitutional error supporting
reversal. The Court will not reverse the trial court's decision to
admit evidence where the trial court rejected the specific ground
upon which the defendant objected to the evidence and then, on
appeal, the defendant argues for reversal based on an evidentiary
rule not raised at trial.
State v. Powell, No.
80535-1 (Apr. 30, 2009). Justice Fairhurst authored the lead
plurality opinion. Justice Stephens authored a
concurring opinion in which
she found that the error was preserved, but was harmless. Justice
Sanders
dissented.
On April 28, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court
granted petitions for review in the following cases:
Public Records Act. Whether metadata in
e-mails are subject to the Public Records Act. O'Neill v. City of
Shoreline, No. 82397-9. COA opinion reported at 145 Wn. App. 913
(2008).
Trial De Novo. Whether the person who
requested a trial de novo pursuant to Mandatory Arbitration Rule 7.3
has the right to unilaterally withdraw that request. Hudson v.
Hapner, No. 82409-6. COA opinion reported at 146 Wn. App. 280
(2008).
Restoration of Firearm Rights. Whether a
defendant who was convicted of vehicular homicide when the offense
was a class B felony is entitled to restoration of his right to
possess a firearm, when his petition to have that right restored was
filed after vehicular homicide was redesignated a class A felony and
persons convicted of class A felonies may not have their rights
restored. Rivard v. State, No. 82431-2. COA opinion reported
at 146 Wn. App. 891 (2008).
Loss of Parental Consortium. Kelley v.
Centennial Contractors, No. 82474-6. COA opinion reported at 147
Wn. App. 290 (2008). Whether a claim for loss of parental consortium
must be joined with the parent’s action for personal injury against
the same defendant.
Division One
Custody. An investigative Terry
detention was not converted into custodial arrest for purposes of
Miranda by the presence of numerous police vehicles.
State v. Marcum, COA
No. 61428-2-I (Apr. 27, 2009).
Informants. An investigative Terry
stop of the defendant’s vehicle was proper based upon the
confidential informant's history of providing accurate information
to the police and his motivation to tell the truth, and by the
police detectives’ corroborating observations.
State v. Marcum, COA
No. 61428-2-I (Apr. 27, 2009).
Competency of a Witness. The burden of
establishing the competency of a mentally disabled 14-year-old
victim is on the State.
State v. S.J.W., COA
No. 61753-2-I (Apr. 27, 2009).
Custody. A juvenile suspect was not in
custody for purposes of Miranda when he was questioned in a
private residence with his mother present. Significantly, the
suspect’s mother summoned another person into the room when she
became upset, and she terminated the interview when the questioning
officer attempted to obtain a written statement.
State v. S.J.W., COA
No. 61753-2-I (Apr. 27, 2009).
Division Two
Competency to Stand Trial. The trial court
denied the defendant’s due process rights when it ordered that the
trial proceed while the defendant was in a coma due to his suicide
attempt and, thus, obviously incompetent to assist counsel or
participate in his trial.
State v. Anene, COA
No. 37374-2-II (Apr. 28, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR APRIL 24, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Search Incident to Arrest. An officer may
conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle upon the arrest of an
occupant only when: (1) the arrestee cannot be secured in a way that
limits his access to the vehicle; or (2) it is reasonable to believe
that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.
Arizona v. Gant, No.
07-542 (Apr. 21, 2009).
Division One
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle. When
calculating the offender score for a conviction for possession of a
stolen vehicle, a prior conviction for vehicle prowling in the
second degree counts as one point whether it is an adult or a
juvenile conviction.
State v. Monson, COA
No. 60748-1-I (Apr. 20, 2009).
Division Two
Resentencing and Double Jeopardy. A
defendant who is resentenced following an appeal has the right to
appeal his or her new sentence. The phrase "statutory maximum" as
used in the Sentencing Reform Act is the term contained in RCW
9A.20.021. The application of a firearm sentencing enhancement to an
assault with a firearm conviction does not violate a defendant’s
protection against double jeopardy.
State v. Toney, COA
No. 36442-5-II (Apr. 21, 2009).
Erotic Dancers. The auditor abused her
discretion by failing to consider any sanction less than a one year
suspension of licence for a violation of the county’s lap dance
ordinance.
Brunson v. Pierce County Auditor,
COA No. 37094-8-II (Apr. 21, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Second Amendment. The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment and
applies it against the states and local governments. The Second
Amendment, however, does not prohibits a local government from
regulating gun possession on its property.
Nordyke v. King, No.
07-15763 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2009).
Pro Se. While a defendant may invoke his
or her self representation rights after a denial of a motion to
substitute counsel, the invocation must be unequivocal. A request to
represent oneself made while at the same time stating a preference
for representation by a different lawyer and rearguing the change of
counsel motion is insufficient to invoke Faretta.
United States v. Mendez-Sanchez,
No. 08-30044 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR APRIL 18, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Guilty Pleas. A miscalculation of an
offender score on one of two charges that occurred three months ago
and that were charged separately, rendered the defendant’s guilty
plea involuntary. The defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea to
both the count with the erroneously calculated offender score and to
the count, whose correctly calculated standard range, was higher
than the standard range of the count with the erroneously calculated
standard range.
In Re PRP of Bradley,
No. 81045-1 (Apr. 16, 2009). Justice Owens authored the
concurrence. Chief Justice
Alexander authored the
dissent. [Editor’s note: In
light of this case, counties may wish to amend their plea offer
forms to indicate that this offer is separate and distinct from plea
offers in any other cause numbers.]
Criminal History. For sentences imposed
prior to the 2008 amendment to RCW 9.94A.500(1), a prosecutor’s
summary of a defendant’s criminal history, even if not objected to
by the defendant in the trial court, is insufficient to establish
the existence of the defendant’s criminal history. In such cases,
the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, with the
State entitled to present evidence of the defendants’ criminal
histories.
State v. Mendoza, No.
80477-0 (April 16, 2009). Justice Owens authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
DNA Sample Collection. The collection of
biological samples for DNA identification purposes may occur during
discovery under CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) if there is probable cause for the
search.
State v. Salgado, COA
No. 60823-1-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Telephone Harassment. A jury instruction
that states that "[a] person commits the crime of Telephone
Harassment when he or she, with intent to harass or intimidate any
other person, makes a telephone call to such other person
threatening to inflict injury on the person called or any member of
the family or household of the person called," adequately conveys
the temporal requirement announced in State v. Lilyblad, 163
Wn.2d 1, 177 P.3d 686 (2008). A defendant can be convicted of both
telephone harassment and intimidating a witness arising from the
same phone call without violating double jeopardy.
State v. Meneses, COA
No. 61118-6-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Criminal Mistreatment. The terms "child"
and "dependent person" in RCW 9A.42.010 are not mutually exclusive.
A child can also be a dependent person.
State v. Mitchell,
COA No. 61462-2-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Double Jeopardy. An indivisible plea of
guilty does not prevent a double jeopardy challenge based on the
same offense theory where the violation is clear from the record and
was not otherwise waived. In this case, the defendant gets his sole
sex offense vacated on double jeopardy grounds as the court finds
that second degree assault and attempted third degree rape
constitute the same offense
State v. Martin, COA
No. 60642-5-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
"Wash-out". A defendant incarcerated for
violating his misdemeanor probation is not considered "in the
community" for purposes of the wash out provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW.
State v. Ervin, COA
No. 60474-1-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Claim Filing Statute. An individual who is
injured by a government employee, while that government employee is
operating an employer provided vehicle within the scope of the
government employee’s duties, must comply with Washington's claim
filing statute before initiating a suit against the government
employee.
Andrea L. Melin-Schilling v. Imm,
COA No. 61921-7-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Sidewalks. Trees planted by a landowner
are an artificial condition on the land, and that an abutting land
owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the trunks,
branches, or roots of trees planted by them adjacent to a public
sidewalk do not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to a pedestrian
using the sidewalk.
Rosengren v. Hughes,
COA No. 60804-5-I (Apr. 13, 2009).
Division Two
Telephone Harassment. A call to the
victim’s residence that is answered by the victim’s friend will
support a conviction for telephone harassment where the victim also
hears the threat.
State v. Sloan, COA
No. 36404-2-II (Feb. 14, 2009).
Division Three
Warrantless Entry. DUI is not a grave offense that will
allow for a warrantless entry into a home to effect an arrest. The
risk of losing blood-alcohol evidence is not a sufficient exigency
that will justify a warrantless entry to effect an arrest.
State v. Hinshaw, COA
No. 26900-1-III (Apr. 16, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR APRIL 11, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Possession of Child Pornography. The unit
of prosecution for child pornography is one count for all images
possessed at one time, regardless of the number of children depicted
in the images or the number of images.
State v. Southby, No.
80169-0 (Apr. 9, 2009). Justice Fairhurst
concurred on this point.
Justice Jim Johnson authored a
dissenting opinion.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. It was
ineffective assistance of counsel for the defendant’s attorney to
fail to seek a severance of the child rape and molestation charges
from the child pornography charges.
State v. Southby, No.
80169-0 (Apr. 9, 2009). Justice Fairhurst
dissented on this point.
Justice Jim Johnson authored a
dissenting opinion
Division One
Time-Bar. A personal restraint filed more
than one year after a conviction is final, that challenges the
inclusion of an out-of-state conviction in the offender score is
time-barred under RCW 10.73.090.
In re Personal Restraint of Banks,
COA No. 60693-0-I (Apr. 6, 2009).
Facial Validity. Facial validity of a
judgment and sentence is directed to the judgment and sentence
itself. That is, the judgment and sentence must evidence the
invalidity without further elaboration. Where the judgment and
sentence results from a plea, the phrase "on its face" includes
those documents signed as part of the plea agreement, and such
documents may be considered if
relevant in assessing the facial validity of the
judgment and sentence.
In re Personal Restraint of Rowland,
COA No. 59685-3-I (Apr. 6, 2009).
Material Change in the Law. Case law
determining that a California burglary is not legally comparable to
a Washington burglary falls within the material change in the law
exception to RCW 10.73.100(6).
In re Personal Restraint of Rowland,
COA No. 59685-3-I (Apr. 6, 2009).
Division Two
Amended Information. The State's amendment
of the information after it had rested its case is not reversible
error when the defendant knows about and agrees to the amendment
before the State rests its case.
State v. Hockaday,
COA No. 35976-6-II (Apr. 7, 2009).
Escape of a Sexually Violent Predator. RCW
9A.76.115 does not violate either double jeopardy or equal
protection.
State v. Jagger, COA
No. 37352-1-II (Apr. 7, 2009).
Escape. The offender score for escape pursuant to RCW
9.94A.525(15), each prior conviction is counted separately.
State v. Combs, COA
No. 37392-1-II (Apr. 7, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR APRIL 3, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Jury Selection. Provided that all jurors
seated in a criminal case are qualified and unbiased, the Due
Process Clause does not require automatic reversal of a conviction
because of the trial court’s good-faith error in denying the
defendant’s peremptory challenge to a juror.
Rivera v. Illinois,
No. 07-9995 (Mar. 31, 2009).
Clemency. Federally funded counsel
appointed to represent a state prisoner, who has been sentenced to
death, in a federal habeas corpus action shall also represent the
defendant in state clemency actions at federal expense.
Harbison v. Bell, No.
07-8521 (Apr. 1, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Dismissal of Juror. A trial court may only
dismiss a seated juror for misconduct pursuant to RCW 2.36.110 only
when the misconduct committed by the juror has affected the juror's
ability to deliberate.
State v. Depaz, No.
80574-1 (Apr. 2, 2009). Justice Madsen authored the
concurring opinion.
On March 31, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court
granted petitions for review in the following cases:
Search of Vehicle Incident to Arrest.
State v. Adams, No. 82210-7. King County. COA opinion
reported at 146 Wn. App. 595 (2008). Whether the justification for a
warrantless search is eliminated when the arrestee is standing 4 to
5 feet from the car at the time of the arrest and the arestee locked
the door of the car.
Warrantless Entry. State v. Ibarra-Cizneros,
No. 82219-1. Walla Walla County. COA opinion reported at 145
Wn. App. 516 (2008). The emergency doctrine does not allow an
officer to make a warrantless entry to search a private residence
where the officer receives an early morning report of noise coming
from a house that looks vacant during the day, the officer sees
lights on and hears party noise coming from the house, and the
officer determines that a vehicle parked in an ungated driveway to
the residence may have been stolen.
Domestic Violence and Unlawful Force.
State v. Aguirre, No. 82226-3. Thurston County. COA
opinion is unpublished. Issues addressed in the unpublished opinion
include whether the State’s DV expert improperly commented on the
defendant’s guilt and the victim’s credibility, various jury
instruction errors, and whether double jeopardy precludes a deadly
weapon enhancement on second degree assault.
Warrantless Entry... State v. Schultz,
No. 82238-7. Clallam County. COA opinion is unreported.
Officers entered house without a warrant as part of an investigation
into a possible DV incident. While in the house, officers observed
drug paraphernalia. Officers then obtained a search warrant which
the defendant challenged as overbroad.
Blakely and Consecutive Sentences.
State v. Vance, No. 81393-1. Snohomish County. COA
opinion reported at 142 Wn. App. 398 (2008).
LFOs. State v. Nason, No. 82333-2.
Spokane County. COA opinion is reported at 146 Wn. App. 744
(2008). Whether this defendant received adequate due process before
being incarcerated for his failure to pay his LFOs. Whether the
defendant was entitled to credit against his LFOs for the time he
spent in jail.
Double Jeopardy. State v. Faagata,
No. 82336-7. Pierce County. COA opinion reported at 147 Wn.
App. 236 (2008). Granted only on double jeopardy issue and
consolidated with State v. Turner, No. 81626-3. COA held that
the defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and
second-degree felony murder did not violate double jeopardy under
Wash. Const. art. I, § 9 or Fifth Amendment because trial court
entered judgment and sentence for only the first-degree murder
conviction, and judgment and sentence remained silent as to the
second-degree felony murder conviction.
Protection Orders. In re Marriage of
Freeman, No. 82283-2. COA opinion reported at 146 Wn. App. 250
(2008). Whether the restrained person under a permanent order of
protection issued in a dissolution action is entitled to have that
order modified in order to obtain a security clearance so he can
continue his military career.
Civil Service Commission. Skinner v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of Medina, No. 82306-5. COA opinion
reported at 146 Wn. App. 171 (2008). Whether the police officer’s
appeal of the civil service commission’s decision was timely when it
was filed within 30 days of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration.
Arbitration. Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW
Inc., No. 82311-1. COA opinion is unreported. Whether the rules
applicable to arbitrators allow them to apply the statutes of
limitations applicable to judicial proceedings.
Real Property. Proctor v. Huntington,
No 82326-0. COA opinion reported at 146 Wn. App. 836 (2008). Battle
over an easement and boundary marker.
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. South
Tacoma Way, LLC v. State, No. 82212-3. COA opinion reported at
146 Wn. App. 639 (2008). Whether DOT’s sale of an alley was ultra
vires.
Division One
Competency Restoration. Prosecutors may
refile charges against an incompetent defendant if the prosecutor
has a good faith basis to believe that the procedures outlined in
chapter 10.77 RCW will likely lead to the restoration of a
defendant's competency to stand trial.
State v. Carneh,
COA No. 61445-2-I (Mar. 30, 2009).
Division Two
Arrest Warrants. An arrest warrant for
failing to report to work crew was valid despite the fact that the
work crew coordinator’s report to the court was not under oath. The
court notes, however, that the better practice would be to have
letters, such as the one the work crew coordinator wrote to the
trial court, be signed under penalty of perjury.
State v. Bishop, COA
No. 36929-0-II (Mar. 31, 2009).
Frivolous Appeals. Property owners who
appealed the denial of their motion to vacate the court's order
dismissing their previously voluntarily withdrawn LUPA appeal are
ordered to pay attorney’s fees to the County.
Spice v. Pierce County,
COA No. 37281-9-II (Mar. 31, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MARCH 27, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defense
counsel is not ineffective if s/he declines to pursue a "nothing to
lose" defense. It is not unreasonable for defense counsel to advise
a defendant to abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of
success. Counsel is not required to have a tactical reason—above and
beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim’s dismal prospects for
success—for recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether.
Competence does not require a defense attorney to browbeat a
reluctant witness into testifying.
Knowles v. Mirzayance,
No. 07-1315 (March 24, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
City Ordinances. A city littering ordinance that
classified the offense as a misdemeanor did not unconstitutionally
conflict with the state statute that makes littering an infraction.
Both the ordinance and the statute can co-exist as the littering
statute did not pre-empt local ordinances and the ordinance does not
legalize something that the state statute prohibits.
State v. Kirwin, No.
80113-4 (Mar. 26, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Sanders authored the
dissent, in which he opines
that an officer may not search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a
passenger. The majority declined to reach this issue. In any event,
the officer in this case prudently limited his search of the vehicle
to that area of the car that the passenger could reach ("grab
zone.").
Double Jeopardy and Andress. Where defendants were
charged with both intentional murder and felony murder predicated on
assault, but the jury was only instructed on felony murder, double
jeopardy does not bar the State from proceeding with the intentional
murder prosecution following the vacation of the felony murder
conviction pursuant to Andress.
State v. Wright, No.
78465-5 (Mar. 26. 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion, which
was joined by Justice Chambers and Chief Justice Alexander.
Division One
Gambling. The 2006 amendment to the Washington Gambling
Act, Chapter 9.46 RCW, by inserting the words "the internet" in the
act's nonexclusive list of media through which the transmission of
"gambling information" is prohibited, does not interfere with
Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and international
commerce.
Rousso v. State, COA
No. 61779-6-I (Mar. 23, 2009).
Division Two
CrR 8.3 Dismissal. Charges of robbery, burglary, and theft
of a firearm were properly dismissed pursuant to CrR 8.3 for
governmental mismanagement and discovery violations where the
prosecution failed: to provide a 60-page victim's statement until
the day before trial; to provide the defendant’s statement to a
deputy from the night of the incident; to provide the lead
detective's report, which likely would have revealed other witnesses
that the defendants needed to interview, and, to subpoena the victim
for trial. While the lag time between the date of the incident and
the date the officers transcribed the report and the witness
statements was beyond the prosecutor's control, the record contained
no evidence that the prosecutor’s office attempted to work with the
sheriff’s office to resolve the delay and there were lengthy (9 day
gaps) between the receipt of transcribed statements in the
prosecutor’s office and their transmission to defense counsel.
State v. Brooks,
COA No. 36171-0-II (Mar. 24, 2009).
Burglary. RCW 9A.52.090(1)'s abandonment defense does not
apply to a charge of second degree burglary.
State v. Jensen, COA
No. 36766-1-II (Mar. 24, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Frisks. Being "testy" and suspected of of illicit drug use
does not support a finding that a suspect may be armed or dangerous.
A pat-down based solely upon these two factors violates the Fourth
Amendment.
Ramirez v. City of Buena Park,
No. 04-56832 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2009).
"Custody." The defendant bears the burden of proving that
he was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.
United States v. Bassignani,
No. 07-10453 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MARCH 20, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Collateral Attacks. A defendant, who was erroneously
advised in both the plea agreement and the judgment and sentence
that the maximum sentence he could receive was "twenty (20) years to
life imprisonment," cannot bring a collateral attack 20 years after
sentencing. The mistaken maximum sentence on the judgment and
sentence, the actual maximum is life, is insufficient to demonstrate
facial invalidity. To be facially invalid, a judgment and sentence
requires a more substantial defect than a technical misstatement
that had no actual effect on the rights of the petitioner.
In re Personal Restraint of McKiernan,
No. 81102-4 (Mar. 19, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MARCH 13, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Speedy Trial. A state is not responsible
for the delays in getting a criminal case to a trial, if those
delays are the result of tactics or omissions by public defender
lawyers. Just because a court-appointed lawyer is from a public
defender’s office does not make those attorneys government actors
for whom the state is responsible for their tactical choices.
Assigned counsel’s blame for delays are to be attributed to the
defense, not the state — unless there is a complete breakdown in the
public defender system.
Vermont v. Brillon,
No. 08-88 (March 9, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
ER 404(b) and Prosecutorial Misconduct. The trial court
properly allowed evidence of the defendant’s physical abuse of his
step children pursuant to ER 404(b). The trial court, however,
conditioned this ruling upon the defendant making an issue of the
victim’s delay in reporting the sexual abuse. The prosecutor erred
by discussing the physical abuse of the step children in his opening
statement and in urging the jury in closing argument to consider the
evidence for purposes other than it was declared admissible.
State v. Fisher, No.
79801-0 (Mar. 12, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring opinion.
Division Two
Discovery. The State must provide a defendant with either
direct access to a seized hard drive or a mirror image copy of the
hard drive in a program used by the defense's computer expert.
State v. Dingman, COA
No. 34719-9-II (Mar. 10, 2009).
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. A level II or III
sex offender cannot be prosecuted for failing to report to the
sheriff every 90 days because the legislature improperly delegated
the responsibility for classifying the offender to the sheriff.
State v. Ramos, COA
No. 36491-3-II (Mar. 10, 2009).
Firearm Enhancements. Petitioners who were charged with
firearm enhancements, but were sentenced for firearm enhancements,
are entitled to be resentenced to the lesser firearm enhancement.
In re Personal Restraint of Delgado,
COA No. 35455-1-II (Mar. 10, 2009).
Firearm Enhancements. A petitioner who was charged with a
firearm enhancement, but whose jury only received a deadly weapon
special verdict form must have his sentence adjusted to reflect the
lesser enhancement.
In re Personal Restraint of Scott,
COA No. 34686-9-II (Mar. 10, 2009).
Division Three
Communication With a Minor for Immoral Purposes. RCW
9.68A.090, which prohibits "communicat[ions] with a minor or with
someone the person believes to be a minor for immoral purposes
through the sending of an electronic communication," is not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
State v. Aljutily,
COA No. 27190-1-III (Mar. 13, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Warrantless Arrest. In 2007, a three judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit ruled that if police, standing outside the home, force
the individual to exit the house, then the warrantless arrest will
be deemed to have occurred "inside" the house. The panel opined that
when a large number of officers are involved in a 12 hour standoff
with a heavily armed individual, one of the officers should obtain
an arrest warrant for the barricaded suspect. See Fisher
v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007). Today, an en
banc panel of the Court holds that during an armed a standoff, once
exigent circumstances justify the warrantless seizure of the suspect
in his home, and so long as the police are actively engaged in
completing his arrest, police need not obtain an arrest warrant
before taking the suspect into full physical custody. This remains
true regardless of whether the exigency that justified the seizure
has dissipated by the time the suspect is taken into full physical
custody.
Fisher v. City of San Jose,
No. 04-16095 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2009) (en banc)
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR MARCH 6, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
On March 3, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court granted petitions
for review in the following cases:
Firearm Enhancements. State v. Kelley,
No. 82111-9. Pierce County. COA opinion reported at 146 Wn.
App. 370 (2008). Whether the firearm enhancement violates double
jeopardy when use of a weapon is an element of the underlying crime.
Interfering with Domestic Violence Reporting.
State v. Nonog, No. 82094-5. King County. COA opinion
reported at 145 Wn. App. 802 (2008). Whether the charging document
for interfering with domestic violence reporting must specify the
underlying domestic violence crime.
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender.
State v. Peterson, No. 82089-9. Snohomish County. COA
opinion reported at 145 Wn. App. 672 (2008). Whether the subsections
of RCW 9A.44.130 define elements and create alternative means of
committing the crime of failure to register as a sex offender.
Guilty Pleas. State v. Sandoval,
No. 82175-5. Grant County. COA opinion is unpublished.
Whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea based upon
his attorney’s misrepresentation of immigration consequences. [Note–
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 23,
2009, of a case entitled Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
No. 08-651. The issue in Padilla is as follows: "Does the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
require a criminal defense attorney to advise a non-citizen client
that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony will trigger mandatory,
automatic deportation, and if that misadvice about deportation
induces a guilty plea, can that misadvice amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel and warrant setting aside the guilty plea?"]
Medical Malpractice. Waples v. Yi,
No. 82142-9. COA opinion reported at 146 Wn. App. 54 (2008). Does
the notice requirement of former RCW 7.70.100(1) violate equal
protection?
Defamation. Momah v. Bharti, No.
82059-7. COA opinion reported at 144 Wn. App. 731 (2008).
Division One
Sanctions. Over $10,000 in sanctions was
properly assessed against an attorney, who inaccurately claimed that
she had just learned of a new witness. Although opposing counsel
violated the rules of discovery by failing to list the witness in
answer to an interrogatory, the sanction attorney learned the
witnesses’ name during a deposition that was conducted seven months
before the start of trial.
Deutscher v. Gabel,
COA No. 58641-6-I (Mar. 2, 2009). Judge Dwyer authored a
dissenting opinion.
Division Two
Assault of a Child. Evidence that a father
acted intentionally in biting his 4-month-old son was sufficient to
establish that he acted recklessly for purposes of second degree
assault of a child. Serious bruising can arise to the level of
substantial bodily injury.
State v. Hovig, COA
No. 36803-0-II (Jan. 13, 2009, publication ordered Mar. 3, 2009).
Planned Residential Developments. A
Planned Residential Development ("PRD") of 11.75 units per acre does
not conflict the requirements of the underlying Residential Business
- 2 ("RB-2") zone. Perimeter set backs are not properly included in
the minimum open space requirement.
City of Gig Harbor v. North Pacific
Design, COA No. 36811-1-II (Mar. 3, 2009).
Division Three
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. The
fugitive disentitlement doctrine will only permit the dismissal of a
defendant’s appeal for his failure to timely report to jail, when
the trial court advises the defendant of this consequence.
State v. Tran, COA
No. 25503-4-III (Mar. 3, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Sex Offenders. RCW 9.94A.728(2)(a), which provides for
convicted sex offenders’ early release into community custody, does
not create a liberty interest that is protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Carver v. Lehman, No.
06-35176 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (replacing opinion filed Dec. 22,
2008).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR FEBRUARY 27, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Domestic Violence and Firearms. In 1996,
Congress extended the prohibition on the possession of firearms and
ammunition to include persons convicted of "a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence." §922(g)(9). The definition of "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence," contained in §921(a)(33)(A), covers a
misdemeanor battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the
offender’s spouse (or other relation specified in §921(a)(33)(A))
even if the domestic relationship is not an element of the predicate
misdemeanor offense.
United States v. Hayes,
No. 07-608 (Feb. 24, 2009).
Tribal Trust Lands. The Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA or Act) authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to acquire land and hold it in trust "for the purpose of
providing land for Indians." Ch. 576, §5, 48 Stat. 985, 25 U. S. C.
§465. The IRA defines the term "Indian" to "include all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction." §479. The phrase "now under Federal
jurisdiction" refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction
at the time ofthe statute’s enactment. As a result, §479 limits the
Secretary’s authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of
providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal
jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.
Carcieri v. Salazar,
No. 07-526 (Feb. 24, 2009).
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on February 23, 2009,in two cases of interest to
prosecutors. These cases will be argued next term.
Forfeiture. Alvarez v. Smith, No.
08-351. Whether local law enforcement agencies may seize and
retain custody indefinitely of personal property without
judicial or administrative review of the lawfulness of the
continued detention of the property.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 08-651. Does the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
require a criminal defense attorney to advise a non-citizen
client that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony will trigger
mandatory, automatic deportation, and if that misadvice about
deportation induces a guilty plea, can that misadvice amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel and warrant setting aside the
guilty plea?
Division One
Sealing Records. A trial court that is
ruling upon a motion to seal court records for a vacated criminal
conviction under the current version of GR 15 must apply the
mandatory five-part individualized analysis articulated in
Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982),
to the request to seal.
State v. Waldon, COA
No. 61019-8-I (Feb. 23, 2009).
Firearm Enhancement. RCW 9.94A.533(3) does
not violate the state and federal guarantees of equal protection, as
the crimes that the statute exempts from the firearm deadly weapon
enhancement are rationally related to the purpose of the sentencing
enhancement.
State v. Pedro-Guerra,
COA No. 60949-1-I (Feb. 23, 2009).
Victim Penalty Assessment. Because a
deferred disposition under RCW 13.40.127 is not a "juvenile offense
disposition," a trial court lacks authority to impose a victim
penalty assessment in such cases.
State v. M.C., COA
No. 61164-0-I (Feb. 23, 2009).
Voyeurism. The unit of prosecution for
voyeurism is each victim whose privacy is violated.
State v. Diaz-Flores,
COA No. 60423-6-I (Feb. 23, 2009).
Public Records Act. When an agency
designates a person to whom Public Records Act requests should be
submitted, a requester who fails to submit his request to the
designated public disclosure coordinator may not maintain a suit
against the agency for failing to respond to the request in a timely
fashion.
Parmelee v. Clarke,
COA No. 60836-3-I (Nov. 24, 2008, publication ordered Feb. 23,
2009).
Sexually Violent Predators. An SVP
detainee may obtain a less restrictive alternative trial (LRA) if he
can show a change in his condition since his initial commitment
trial, rather than since his revocation hearing from a prior
conditional LRA. But, in order to get such a trial, the proposed LRA
must address the five conditions listed in RCW 71.09.092.
In re Detention of Jones,
COA No. 61025-2-I (Feb. 23, 2009).
Division Two
Sexually Violent Predators. A jury that is
confronted with evidence of several types of personality disorders
need not unanimously agree on which personality disorder causes the
detainee difficulty in controlling his behavior such that he is
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confined to a secure facility.
In re Detention of Sease,
COA No. 36600-2-II (Feb. 24, 2009).
Growth Management. The Department of
Ecology's proposed guidelines, which were not in effect when the
City forwarded its amendment to its Shoreline Master Program (SMP)
to Ecology for review, were not applicable to the City's amendment
to its SMP that Ecology examined to confirm compliance with the
Shoreline Management Act (SMA). The City’s amendment to its SMP
prohibiting private docks in this shoreline of statewide
significance is consistent with statutory guidelines because it
promotes the public's ability to enjoy Blakely Harbor's aesthetic
qualities and to navigate its waters.
Samson v. City of Bainbridge Island,
COA No. 34780-6-II (Feb. 24, 2009).
Division Three
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor. The term
"photograph" as used in RCW 9.68A.040 includes a Webcam viewing.
State v. Ritter, COA
No. 26804-7-III (Feb. 26, 2009).
Consecutive Sentences. A sentencing court
has the authority, pursuant to RCW 9.94A.589(3), to run the sentence
for a current conviction consecutively to a sentence the defendant
is already serving, without identifying aggravating circumstances or
declaring an exceptional sentence.
State v. King, COA
No. 26695-8-III (Feb. 26, 2009).
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender.
Insufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for
failing to register. While the State proved that the defendant’s
rent was not paid, that his landlord vacated him from his apartment,
and that his possessions were stored and picked up by someone else
after he was arrested, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew of his ouster from his apartment
triggering his obligation to register at a new address or as a
homeless person.
State v. Drake, COA
No. 26609-5-III (Feb. 26, 2009).
Domestic Violence Protection Orders. A
trial court lacks the authority to issue a DV protection order under
RCW 26.50.010 to protect a child , who is less than 16 years old,
from a person with whom the child had a violent dating relationship.
Neilson ex rel. Krump v. Blanchette,
COA No. 27066-1-III (Feb. 26, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Malicious Prosecution. A malicious prosecution action
filed against a deputy prosecuting attorney, who signed the
certificate of probable cause, was properly dismissed as the DPA had
probable cause to file the charges.
Lassiter v. City of Bremerton,
No. 07-35848 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR FEBRUARY 20, 2009
Division One
Preferential Treatment in Employment. In an action brought
pursuant to RCW 49.60.400, the white employee met his burden of
showing that material issues of fact exist as to whether the fire
chief's stated basis for promoting a less-qualified African-American
applicant to the position of fireboat engineer. The evidence
presented was that in the 4 of 45 instances in which the chief
promoted someone other than the top-scoring applicant – the promoted
person belonged to a racial or ethnic minority group, while the
top-scoring person was a white male, that the plaintiff in the
instant action scored 11-points higher than the minority candidate
and had never been subjected to official discipline, and that the
promoted minority candidate had been subjected to official
discipline 17 times over the course of his career.
Dumont v. City of Seattle, COA No. 61701-0-I (Feb. 17,
2009).
Division Two
Domestic Violence No Contact Orders.
Former RCW 26.50.110 (1) is violated by contact that would not
require mandatory arrest.
State v. Wofford, COA
No. 36444-1-II (Feb. 18, 2009).
Collective Bargaining Agreements. When a
new CBA includes a retroactive term provision, then the employer is
required to arbitrate grievances that occur in the period between
the expiration of one CBA and the execution of the new CBA.
Kitsap County Deputy Sheriffs Guild v. Kitsap County, COA No.
37173-1-II (Feb. 18, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Crawford and Non-Existence of Government Records. A
"certificate of nonexistence of a record (CNR)," which is an
affidavit from a government official that essentially states that "a
diligent search of the department’s files failed to disclose any
record of [record that was looked for--i.e. "wages reported for [the
defendant] rom January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2007" is
non-testimonial in nature. United States v. Norwood, No.
08-30050 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009)
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR FEBRUARY 13, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Accomplice Liability. The only survivor of a single car
accident cannot be charged as an accomplice to DUI or reckless
driving under RCW 9A.08.020.
City of Auburn v. Hedlund,
No. 80110-0 (Feb. 12, 2009). Justice Madsen authored the
dissenting opinion. [Editor’s note: This case does
not resolve whether the survivor could be charged as an accomplice
under the traffic code’s aiding and abetting statute, RCW
46.64.048.]
Double Jeopardy. The Court’s opinion reported at 160 Wn.2d
256, 156 P.3d 905 (2007), is reaffirmed. That opinion held that when
a felony murder is reversed on appeal because one of two or more
charged predicate offenses is invalid, the defendant may be retried
on felony murder based on any of the valid alternative predicate
offenses supported by sufficient evidence without being placed in
double jeopardy. That opinion also held that when a jury is unable
to agree on the greater charge, marks the jury verdict forms in a
manner that indicates it hung on the greater charge, then the State
can retry the defendant on the greater charge when the defendant
appeals her conviction on the lesser offense and obtains relief.
State v. Daniels, No.
76802-1 (Feb. 12, 2009). Justice Madsen authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Sanders, who authored the original Daniels opinion, filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice
Chambers authored a separate
dissenting opinion.
Three Strikes. A pre-SRA, non-RCW 9A, 1974 robbery
conviction did not constitute a "strike" as its elements are
comparable to a second degree robbery and the defendant spent more
than 10 crime-free years in the community. When assessing these
older convictions, courts are directed to use RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u),
which looks to elements, instead of RCW 9.94A.035, which looks to
length of sentence.
State v. Failey, No.
81557-7 (Feb. 12, 2009).
Jury Selection. RCW 2.36.055, which King County to divide
itself into two superior court jury districts, does not violate
Const. art. I, § 22.
State v. Lanciloti,
No. 81219-5 (Feb. 12, 2009).
Division One
Indecent Liberties. Consent is an affirmative defense to a
charge of indecent liberties under RCW 9A.44.100(1)(a). Instructions
along the lines of WPIC 45.04 and WPIC 18.25 are appropriate.
Rape in the third degree is not a lesser included offense to the
crime of indecent liberties.
State v. Buzzell, COA
No. 60012-5 (Feb. 9, 2009).
Division Two
Merger and Double Jeopardy. Double jeopardy is not
violated by convictions for both unlawful possession of drugs with
intent to manufacture and unlawful manufacture of drugs as the two
offenses do not meet the Blockburger test.
State v. Danielson,
COA No. 36470-1-II (Feb. 10, 2009).
Restitution. Restitution, as defined in RCW 13.40.020(22),
does not include an award for unperformed but anticipated medical
procedures.
State v. C.A.E., COA
No. 36739-4-II (Feb. 10, 2009).
Community Caretaking. The community caretaking doctrine
did not authorize the warrantless entry into a motel room based upon
a report from someone outside the motel room that a person inside
his motel room had assaulted him and he wished to have the assailant
removed from the room, because there was no evidence that someone
still inside the motel room required medical or other immediate
assistance.
State v. Williams,
COA No. 36539-1-II (Feb. 10, 2009).
Right of Entry Agreements. The government need not advise
a property owner of his right to refuse to grant permission for
officials to enter his property so they can monitor the property
owner’s compliance with a conditional land use permit. Due process
only requires that the hearing examiner, in order to revoke a
conditional land use permit, determine that the property owner
violated the conditions of the conditional land use permit by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Bonneville v. Pierce County,
COA No. 36895-1-II (Nov. 4, 2008, publication ordered Feb. 10,
2009).
Land Use Vesting. The subject property did not qualify for
a wetlands reasonable use exception because, despite the fact that a
testamentary segregation divided the interest in the property before
the critical March 1, 2005, the lots were not vested until the
master applications were filed on November 28 and 29, 2005, well
past the vesting deadline.
Sylvester v. Grace Group, Inc.,
COA No. 37282-7-II (Feb. 10, 2009).
Division Three
Corpus Delicti. Where a young child describes an act of
attempted sexual intercourse, there is sufficient evidence to admit
the defendant's statement that he succeeded in achieving
penetration, even though his victim did not know that fact.
State v. Angulo, COA
No. 26492-1-III (Feb. 10, 2009). Judge Schultheis
dissented.
Child Support. A parent who is in arrears on child support
may, nonetheless, obtain a "reimbursement" under RCW 26.19.080(3)
certain expenses not actually incurred by the obligee parent. The
obligee parent does not establish that the expenses were incurred by
producing a self-serving declaration. Rather the obligee parent must
produce cancelled checks, prior tax returns, declarations from
child-care providers, receipts for medical co-payments, and the
like. Where an obligor parent waits a long time to make the request
for "reimbursement", the obligee parent may be able to raise
equitable defenses such as estoppel and laches.
Fairchild v. Davis,
COA No. 26818-7-III (Feb. 12, 2009). Judge Korsmo
dissented.
Ninth Circuit
Confrontation Clause. The trial court’s exclusion of the
evidence of a key witnesses’ probation, when the witness testified
to the contrary, violated the defendant’s confrontation clause
rights.
Slovik v. Yates, No.
06-55867 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009).
Indian. The government failed to satisfy its burden
of establishing that the defendant was an "Indian" for criminal law
purposes where the evidence was insufficient to establish "tribal or
federal government recognition as an Indian". The defendant was not
an enrolled member of any tribe, he has never taken advantage of any
tribal benefits to which he was entitled as a descendent, he only
resided on the reservation between the ages of 6 and 7, he attended
a school on the reservation that was open to non-Indians, and he
never attended any ceremonies or dance festivals, has never voted in
a Blackfeet tribal election, and did not have a tribal
identification card.
United States v. Cruz,
No. 07-30384 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009). [Editor’s note: The
Washington test for who is an "Indian" for criminal law purposes
also requires proof of "tribal or federal government recognition as
an Indian". See State v. Daniels, 104 Wn. App. 271,
278, 16 P.3d 650 (2001).]
Retaliatory Discharge. A final decision maker’s wholly
independent, legitimate decision to terminate an employee can
insulate from liability a lower-level supervisor involved in the
process who had a retaliatory motive to have the employee fired.
Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah County,
No. 05-35896 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR FEBRUARY 6, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
On February 3, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court
granted petitions for review in the following cases:
Custodial Interference. State v. Boss,
No. 81897-5. King County. COA opinion reported at 144 Wn.
App. 878 (2008). Whether the defendant’s knowledge of the validity
of the custody order is an element of the offense of custodial
interference in the first degree? Whether the validity of the order
is a question of law for the trial court to decide as part of its
gate-keeping function? Whether, in a prosecution for first degree
custodial interference under RCW 9A.40.060(1), the State must prove
that the defendant knew, at the time the crime was alleged to have
been committed, that someone other than the defendant had a lawful
right to physical custody of the child in question?
Prison Litigation.
Parmelee v. O’Neel, No. 82128-3. COA opinion reported at
145 Wn. App. 223 (2008). Whether inmate was improperly infracted for
violating the state misdemeanor criminal libel statute? Whether the
inmate may recover damages for First Amendment retaliation by DOC?
Conditional Use Permits. Kelly v.
County of Chelan, No. 81855-0. COA opinion reported at 145 Wn.
App. 166 (2008). Whether a developer can take advantage of the
vested rights doctrine when he misses deadlines contained in the
conditional use permit?
Termination of Parental Rights. In re
Dependency of Singleton, No. 81720-1. COA opinion is
unpublished. Whether the State must offer a mother a psychological
assessment and family preservation or home support services, despite
the mother’s failure to address her substance abuse problem?
Fraudulent Transfer of Property. Was
liability for the husband’s long-term sexual abuse of a child
properly assessed on the ex-wife when the divorce decree transferred
all assets to the ex-wife? Clayton v. Wilson, No. 81920-3.
COA opinion reported at 144 Wn. App. 86 (2008).
Liquidation of Closely Held Corporations.
Sound Infiniti, Inc. v. Snyder, No. 81923-8.
COA opinion reported at 145 Wn. App. 333 (2008).
Use Tax. G-P Gypsum
Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 81995-5. COA opinion
reported at 144 Wn. App. 664 (2008). Whether a city’s use tax
applied to natural gas under the circumstances presented.
Division One
Comparability of Foreign Convictions. The
production of a charging document from another jurisdiction is
sufficient to establish comparability for purposes of sentencing in
Washington if the law of the other jurisdiction holds that a
defendant’s guilty plea to a charging document constitutes an
admission of the facts alleged by the government in the charging
document.
State v. Releford,
COA No. 59701-9-I (Feb. 2, 2009).
Replica Antique Pistol. A replica antique
firearm constitutes a "firearm" for purposes of the unlawful
possession of a firearm statute, despite missing its flint. The
absence of a flint is the equivalent of an unloaded modern firearm.
The only effort required to make the pistol fully operational was a
trip to obtain the ammunition at a nearby specialty gun shop.
State v. Releford,
COA No. 59701-9-I (Feb. 2, 2009).
Probable Cause to Arrest. Officers had
probable cause to arrest a woman for theft, where the woman picked
up a casino ticket belonging to another and attempted to cash it.
The woman’s "innocent explanation" that she thought the ticket was
abandoned was rejected under the circumstances – not the type of
property generally abandoned and the ticket was left unattended for
only a brief period of time.
State v. Wagner, COA
No. 60828-2-I (Feb. 2, 2009).
Tax Foreclosure Proceedings. Before real
property that is owned as a tenancy in common can be foreclosed for
failure to pay taxes, the County must send a separate notice by
certified mail to each cotenant whose interest is being foreclosed.
A single notice sent to cotenants together does not satisfy the
statutory notice requirement, and will result in an invalid
foreclosure proceeding.
Homeowners Solutions, LLC. v. Nguyen,
COA No. 61267-1-I (Feb. 2, 2009).
Division Two
Felony DUI. The prior convictions that are
elements of felony DUI are properly included in the calculation of
the offender score.
State v. Draxinger,
COA No. 36952-4 (Dec. 23, 2008, publication ordered Feb. 3, 2009).
Division Three
Terry. Facts sufficient to justify
a Terry stop for suspected drug offense existed where the
defendant entered a known drug house at 3:20 a.m. for a
two-minute-long visit.
State v. Doughty, COA
No. 26573-1-III (Feb. 5, 2009). Judge Schultheis
dissented.
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR JANUARY 30, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Prosecutorial Immunity. Supervising district
attorneys possess absolute immunity against claims they failed to
ensure line prosecutors disclosed constitutionally required
information to criminal defendants.
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
No. 07-854 (Jan. 26, 2009).
Pat-Downs. In the context of a vehicular stop
for a minor traffic infraction, an officer may conduct a pat-down
search of a passenger when the officer has an articulable basis to
believe the passenger might be armed and presently dangerous, but
had no reasonable grounds to believe that the passenger is
committing, or has committed, a criminal offense.
Arizona v. Johnson,
No. 07-1122 (Jan. 26, 2009). This Fourth Amendment decision appears
consistent with the Const. Art. I, § 7 opinion in State v. Mendez,
137 Wn.2d 208, 970 P.2d 722 (1999).
Anti-Retaliation. Federal law protects a
worker from being fired after telling investigators, in an internal
probe, about sexual harassment on the job. The anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII, a key workplace anti-bias law extends to a
worker who speaks out about discrimination not on her own, but in
answering questions during an employer-ordered investigation.
Crawford v. Metro Government of
Nashville , No. 06-1595 (Jan. 26, 2009).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
following case of interest to prosecutors:
Interrogations. Maryland v. Shatzer, Sr.,
No. 08-680. Whether Edwards v. Arizona (1981), which
bars police from initiating questioning with criminal suspects
who have invoked their right to counsel, applies to an
interrogation that takes place nearly three years later.
Pleadings in this case may be found on
SCOUTUSWiki.
Division Two
Pre-arrest Silence. The State may not use
a testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as evidence of guilt.
Such silence may only be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony.
State v. Knapp, COA
No. 36098-5-II (Jan. 27, 2009).
Public Trials. A defendant who waived his
right to an open trial, lacks standing to object on the public’s
behalf, to the private questioning of certain jurors in the judge’s
chambers.
State v. Wise, COA
No. 36625-8-II (Jan. 27, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR JANUARY 23, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Accomplice Liability. The Ninth Circuit’s
grant of habeas corpus on the grounds that an accomplice jury
instruction that quoted RCW 9A.08.020 verbatim violated the
defendant’s constitutional rights by confusing the jury is reversed.
Waddington v. Sarausad,
No. 07-772 (Jan. 21, 2009).
§ 1983. Saucier, which mandated a
two-step sequence for resolving government officials’ qualified
immunity claims: is overruled. A court now may skip the question of
whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a
violation of a constitutional right, and may immediately proceed to
determine whether the right that the plaintiff alleges was "clearly
established" at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Pearson v. Callahan,
No. 07-751 (Jan. 21, 2009).
Washington Supreme Court
Exigent Circumstances. Officer’s
warrantless entry into a house was justified under the "officer and
public safety" prong of the "exigent circumstances" exception to the
warrant requirement by a combination of large quantities of a toxic
chemical and a missing firearm.
State v. Smith, No.
79917-2 (Jan. 22, 2009). Justice Sanders authored the
dissenting opinion.
Public Records Act. The one year period
for filing an action under RCW 42.56.550(6) to challenge a public
agency’s claim of exemption or withholding of documents does not
begin to run until the public agency provides a detailed privilege
log under RCW 42.56.210(3) and Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y
v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 884 P.2d 592 (1994).
Rental Housing Ass’n of Puget Sound v.
City of Des Moines, No. 80532-6 (Jan. 22, 2009).
Justice Fairhurst authored a
concurring opinion. Justice
Madsen authored the
dissenting opinion.
Division One
Time for Trial. The 2003 amendments to CrR
3.3 and 4.1 eliminated the judicially created doctrine of
constructive arraignment -- the Striker rule.
State v. Rookhuyzen,
COA No. 61427-4-I (Jan. 20, 2009).
Paternity. The State of Washington has
standing to challenge paternity when there is a presumed father.
In re the Parentage of M.K.M.R.,
COA No. 61138-1-I (Jan. 20, 2009).
Contributory Negligence. Where there is no
issue of joint and several liability and plaintiffs seek damages
only for injuries caused by a single defendant's negligence, there
is no need to instruct the jury to segregate damages caused by
intentional conduct. Thus, if the plaintiff only sues one defendant
and only alleges a claim of negligence, the defendant is not
entitled to have the jury determine what portion of the plaintiff’s
loss was due to the intentional conduct of another.
King County v. Rollins,
COA No. 61137-2-I (Jan. 20, 2009).
Division Three
Blakely Error. An exceptional
sentence that was imposed at a time when the SRA did not allow for
the empaneling of a jury to determine the existence of aggravating
circumstances cannot be harmless error.
State v. Pleasant,
COA No. 21922-4-III (Jan. 22, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Brady. The government does not
violate Brady by failing to call an individual who was listed
on their witness list at trial.
United States v. Bond,
No. 06-50628 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2009).
Prosecutor Immunity. Prosecutor enjoy absolute immunity
for parole and clemency recommendations.
Brown v. California Department of
Corrections, No. 07-55409 (9th Cir.
Jan. 23, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR JANUARY 16, 2009
United States Supreme Court
Blakely and Consecutive Sentences. The Sixth Amendment
does not inhibit States from assigning to judges, rather than to
juries, the finding of facts necessary to the imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for multiple
offenses.
Oregon v. Ice, No.
07-901 (Jan. 14, 2009). [Editor’s note: This opinion is contrary to
the Washington Supreme Court opinion of In re Personal Restraint
of Van Delft, 158 Wn.2d 731, 147 P.3d 573 (2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2876 (2007). Since Van Delft rested
only upon the federal constitution, the United States Supreme
Court’s opinion in Ice controls the issue in Washington
Courts. See generally State v. Radcliffe, 164 Wn.2d
900, 907, 194 P.3d 250 (2008) (when the United States Supreme Court
decides an issue under the United States Constitution, all other
courts must follow the Supreme Court's rulings); State v.
Laviollette, 118 Wn.2d 670, 673, 826 P.2d 684 (1992) (the United
States Supreme Court is the final arbiter of controversies arising
under the federal constitution and Washington courts must follow
their interpretation of a particular provision); State v. Nixon,
10 Wn. App. 355, 357, 517 P.2d 212 (1973), review denied, 83
Wn.2d 1014 (1974) (if a United State Supreme Court's decision or
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is in conflict with that
rendered by the Washington State Supreme Court, the decision of the
United States Supreme Court controls)].
Good Faith Exception to Suppression. When police mistakes, such
as failing to recall an arrest warrant, leading to an unlawful
search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the
search, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Herring v. United States,
No. 07-513 (Jan. 14, 2008). [Editor’s note: This opinion will have
no effect in Washington as our appellate courts have already
rejected this theory under Const. art. I, § 7.]
Washington Supreme Court
Separation of Powers. The 2007 statutory
definition of "disability" that the Legislature declared should be
applied retroactively to causes of action occurring the day before
the opinion in McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214, 137
P.3d 844 (2006), was filed and to causes of action occurring on or
after the effective date of the amendment does not violate
separation of powers.
Hale v. Wellpinit School District, #49,
No. 80771-0 (Jan. 15, 2009).
Nunc Pro Tunc. A trial court misuses its nunc pro
tunc power and abuses its discretion when it uses such an order to
change its mind or rectify a mistake of law. But where the record
demonstrates that the court intended to take, and believed it was
taking, a particular action only to have that action thwarted by
inartful drafting, a nunc pro tunc order stands as a means of
translating the court's intention into an order.
State v. Hendrickson,
No. 80245-9 (Jan. 15, 2009).
Public Records Act. A sanction of $15 a day for
King County’s noncompliance with the Public Records Act was
insufficient under the facts of this case. In calculating the
appropriate sanction on remand, the trial court should consider the
entire legislative penalty range, with no presumption that the
minimum penalty should be applied. Mitigating factors to be
considered are: (1) the lack of clarity of the PRA request; (2) an
agency's prompt response or legitimate follow-up inquiry for
clarification7; (3) good faith, honest, timely, and strict
compliance with all the PRA procedural requirements and exceptions;
(4) proper training and supervision of personnel; (5) reasonableness
of any explanation for noncompliance; (6) helpfulness of the agency
to the requestor; and (6) the existence of systems to track and
retrieve public records. Aggravating factors that increase a penalty
are (1) a delayed response, especially in circumstances making time
of the essence; (2) lack of strict compliance with all the PRA
procedural requirements and exceptions; (3) lack of proper training
and supervision of personnel and response; (4) unreasonableness of
any explanation for noncompliance; (5) negligent, reckless, wanton,
bad faith, or intentional noncompliance with the PRA; (6)
dishonesty; (7) potential for public harm, including economic loss
or loss of governmental accountability11; (8) personal economic
loss; and (9) a penalty amount necessary to deter future misconduct
considering the size of the agency and the facts of the case.
Yousoufian v. The Office of Ron Sims, No. 80081-2 (Jan. 15,
2009). The
lead opinion of the
plurality was authored by Justice Sanders. Justice Chambers authored
a
concurring opinion. Justice
Jim Johnson authored a separate
concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Alexander authored an opinion that
concurred in part and dissented in part.
Justice Owens authored a
dissenting opinion.
Division One
Jail Phone Calls. A pre-trial detainee has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in jail telephone conversations.
Accordingly, a recording of such conversations may not be suppressed
as a violation of Const. art. I, § 7.
State v. Archie, COA
No. 60227-6-I (Jan. 12, 2009)
Truancy. A proceeding to declare a child truant
affects the child's rights to liberty, privacy, and education. Due
process requires that the child be afforded counsel at the initial
hearing, despite RCW 28A.225.035(11), which provides that "[t]he
court may permit the first hearing to be held without requiring that
either party be represented by legal counsel, and to be held without
a guardian ad litem for the child."
Bellevue School Dist. v. E. S.,
COA No. 60528-3-I (Jan. 12, 2009).
Claim Filing Statute. The failure to explicitly
state the location where an individual signs, under penalty of
perjury, the tort claim to be submitted under the claim filing
statute is not fatal to the tort claim if the place of signing is
reasonably inferred from the information provided in the claim.
Johnson v. King County,
COA No. 61047-3-I (Jan. 12, 2009).
Division Two
Possession with Intent to Deliver. Evidence was
sufficient to sustain convictions for possession with intent to
deliver, despite the fact that officers did not discover marijuana
on the defendant’s persons or within their vehicles. Circumstantial
evidence supported the conclusion that the black plastic bags that
the defendant were observed removing from a known drug house
contained marijuana, as marijuana was found in a similar bag that
was in the custody of another driver.
State v. Sanchez, COA
No. 36029-2-II (Jan. 13, 2009).
Community Custody Conditions. State v. Bahl,
164 Wn.2d 739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008), which held that a preenforcement
challenge to a community custody condition prohibiting the
possession of pornographic material ripe for review, does not
require appellate courts to abandon the ripeness doctrine for all
preenforcement challenged to community custody provisions. The
defendant’s preenforcement challenge to a community custody
condition prohibiting the possession of drug paraphernalia, which
does not implicate First Amendment rights, is not ripe for review.
State v. Sanchez, COA
No. 36029-2-II (Jan. 13, 2009).
Community Custody Conditions. A community custody
condition prohibiting drug traffickers from possessing cellular
telephones and electronic storage devices was clearly a valid
crime-related prohibition.
State v. Sanchez, COA
No. 36029-2-II (Jan. 13, 2009).
Sexual Misconduct With a Minor. RCW
9A.44.093(1)(b) only criminalizes sexual contact between school
employees and students aged 16 and 17.
State v. Hirschfelder,
COA No. 36804-8-II (Jan. 13, 2009).
Division Three
Legal Financial Obligations. The 10-year
jurisdictional time limit for collecting LFOs begins after release
from the initial term of incarceration, rather than from release
from subsequent periods of incarceration imposed in the same action.
State v. Olson, COA
26749-1-III (Jan. 13, 2009).
Medical Marijuana. A defendant’s presentation of
the paperwork supporting his primary care giver affirmative defense
to police 1 ½ years after arrest is not fatal to the assertion of
the affirmative defense as the defendant was arrested away from home
and, once at the jail, the police did not give him the opportunity
to retrieve his documents.
State v. Adams, COA
No. 26168-9-III (Jan. 13, 2009).
Ninth Circuit
Prosecutor Civil Liability. Qualified immunity is not available
to a prosecutor, being sued in his individual capacity, by a deputy
who claims that he was retaliated against for statement’s the deputy
district attorney’s attorney made to the press.
Eng. v. Cooley, No.
07-56055 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009).
WEEKLY UPDATE FOR
JANUARY 9, 2009
Supreme Court
On January
6, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court granted review in the
following cases:
Felony Harassment. State v. Schaler,
No. 81864-9. Okanogan County. COA opinion is reported at 145
Wn. App. 628 (2008). Whether the jury must receive an instruction
defining "true threats."
Non-Parental Custody Action. In re the
Custody of Wilson, No. 81945-9. COA opinion is reported at 144
Wn. App. 865 (2008).
U.C.C. and Letters of Credit. Alhadeff v.
Meridian on Bainbridge Island, LLC, No. 81833-9. COA opinion is
reported at 144 Wn. App. 928 (2008).
Reimbursement from Third Party. Tobin v.
Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 81946-7. Review taken of issues
raised by both the petitioner and the respondent. COA opinion is
reported at 145 Wn. App. 607 (2008).
Unlawful Detainer and Lease Defaults.
Eastwood, dba Double KK Farm v.
Horse Harbor Found., Inc., No. 81977-7. COA opinion is
unpublished.
Code Enforcement at a Mobile Home Park.
Lawson v. City of Pasco, No. 81636-. COA opinion is reported at
144 Wn. App. 203 (2008).
Condominium Ownership.
Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n,
No. 81873-8. COA opinion is reported at 142 Wn. App. 356 (2007).
Division Two
Public Records Act.
Release, under the Public Records Act (PRA), of loan records
received by the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) during litigation
with the loan company cannot proceed until the loan customers are be
notified and have an opportunity to respond. Federal law does not
preempt the PRA regarding non-public information contained in the
customer loan files. The loan company is not entitled to a
preliminary injunction to prevent the release of the items based
upon an argument that the AGO’s decision to release its attorney
work product is arbitrary and capricious.
Ameriquest
Mortgage Company v. State Attorney General
WEEKLY UPDATE
FOR JANUARY 2, 2009
Washington Supreme Court
Physical Control. Actual physical control
is an included offense of DUI.
State v. Nguyen, No.
80752-3 (Dec. 31, 2008).
Division One
Certificates of Discharge. A sentencing
court has a non-discretionary obligation to issue a certificate of
discharge effective as of the date it receives notice that an
offender has completed all requirements of the sentence.
State v. Johnson, COA
No. 61311-1-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
Terry Stops. Information supporting
a Terry stop will be reviewed under the totality of the
circumstances test instead of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
Police are allowed to give great credence to information provided by
a citizen who has been a victim of a crime.
State v. Lee, COA No.
60669-7-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
Telephone Harassment. A call to a public
official may support a charge of telephone harassment when the
caller has the requisite intent at the time of making the call. The
misdemeanor portion of RCW 9.61.230 is not unconstitutionally
overbroad based upon the absence of statutory definitions for the
terms "lewd, lascivious, indecent, and obscene". The statute is also
not unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Alphonse,
COA No. 58449-9-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
Banishment Orders. An order banishing a
defendant convicted of telephone harassment from the City of Everett
was too broad. A narrower order could adequately protect the victim.
State v. Alphonse,
COA No. 58449-9-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sex Offenses.
When multiple identical charges of sex abuse are alleged, care must
be taken to ensure that each "to convict" instruction requires the
jury to find a different and distinct act. As a general rule, a
separate "to convict" instruction should be offered for each count,
and each "to convict" instruction should include language along the
lines of "'on a day other than [the other count]'" or "'in an
incident separate from and in addition to any incident that may have
been proved in [the other] count.'"
State v. Berg, COA
No. 60729-4-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
No Contact Orders with Biological Children.
A court may order a child rapist to not have unsupervised contact
with his own biological children when the rapes occurred in the
family home and the rapist exploited his role as a parent figure to
gain the victim’s trust.
State v. Berg, COA
No. 60729-4-I (Dec. 29, 2008).
Community Custody. A trial court may no
longer impose a community custody term that theoretically exceeds
the statutory maximum along with clarifying language on the judgment
and sentence that the total term of incarceration and community
custody cannot exceed the maximum. Such a sentence is not authorized
by the SRA because it is indeterminate in nature.
State v. Linerud,
COA No. 60769-3-I (Dec. 29, 2008). [Editor’s note– This opinion
expressly overrules Division One’s prior affirmance of this practice
in State v. Davis, 146 Wn. App. 714, 192 P.3d 29 (2008).]
Division Two
Judicial Conflicts. A defendant who fails
to move for a judge’s recusal in the trial court, based upon the
judge’s former representation of the defendant, waives the issue on
appeal.
State v. Morgensen,
COA No. 36853-6-II (Dec. 30, 2008).
Replaying Testimony. A trial court's
decision to allow the jury to listen to an audiotape of trial
testimony during deliberations will be reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard, taking into consideration the factors set forth
in State v. Koontz, 145 Wn.2d 650, 41 P.3d 475 (2002).
State v. Morgensen,
COA No. 36853-6-II (Dec. 30, 2008).
Division Three
Ninth Circuit |